

JPRS-SSA-87-091  
4 DECEMBER 1987



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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Africa (Sub-Sahara)**

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# Africa (Sub-Sahara)

JPRS-SSA-87-091

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4 DECEMBER 1987

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### Shifting Priorities in Soviet African Policy Analyzed

34000037 Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL  
in English 9-15 Oct 87 p 5

[Article by Anc. Phillip Van Niekerk]

[Text] Angola has become the blood-stained corner of a regional and global chessboard with the key players in Pretoria, Washington and Moscow.

The use of United States-supplied missiles and South African troops to blunt an Angolan government offensive against Unita led by one General Konstantin Shagnovitch has created the impression of heated-up superpower rivalry in Southern Africa.

For white South Africans the image of sinister Soviet designs in the region has been enhanced by the deep Soviet involvement in the campaign.

It is difficult to square this image with the message coming out of the Moscow-based Institute of African Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, which is of a softening of the Soviet line on Southern Africa in favour of a negotiated settlement.

This has been most clearly spelt out in recent public statements by Victor Goncharov and Gleb Starushenko, two of the five deputy directors at the Africa Institute.

The chief difference between the two is that Staa-rushenko has mooted the notion of an ethnically-based parliament with a veto for each group in a post-apartheid South Africa.

In a recent interview with the FRANKFURTER ALL-GEMEINE ZEITUNG Starushenko said that Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi's Inkatha movement could not be written out of the negotiations which should be broadly based and not limited to the government and the African National Congress.

Though this is probably a minority view at the Institute, the similarities between the two academics are even more revealing.

A West German expert on Soviet policy in Southern Africa, Dr Winrich Kuhne, of the Munich-based Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, says these are: a belief that Southern Africa offers the potential of regional cooperation with the US; opposition to an escalation of military struggle; and a belief that South Africa is not ripe for socialism.

The Institute view is more consistent with the global strategic interests and arms of the Soviet Union in the Gorbachev era than the crude image of an expansionist superpower.

In places Southern Africa way down on the list of priorities and superpower cooperation, particularly in regions with explosive potential, high on the list.

"We should take into account the global problems and the global consequences of our behaviour in every part of the world," Goncharov said in an interview in WORK IN PROGRESS earlier this year.

"In our very complicated world, the two superpowers should avoid confrontation, not only in South Africa, but in other parts of the world."

Kuhne believes that the Soviet Union does not wish to become embroiled in a regional conflict with the US which could put at risk crucial strategic objectives such as the arms control talks.

"They are seriously worried that if there is a real serious conflagration in Southern Africa both superpowers would be compelled by their clients, by their commitments, to become involved."

Kuhne says the Soviets no longer see Southern Africa as a region where they can set up Eastern bloc-type satellite regimes which would fall under their ideological and military hegemony.

"In fact," says Kuhne, "the Soviet Union no longer sees Africa as a very promising place for world revolution. They have problems of their own, as everybody knows."

This he backs up by pointing to the refusal to admit Mozambique and Ethiopia to the Comecon, the Eastern bloc's economic club, and to supply military aid to Mozambique against Renamo.

To accept this view would be to undercut the rationale which Pretoria trots out when it periodically admits to sending tin South African troops in support of Unita's Jonas Savimbi.

In 1985—the last time Svaimbi was under as severe a threat as he is now and the last time there was as heavy a South African involvement—Defence Minister General Magnus Malan came clean for the first time that Pretoria was supplying Unita with "moral, material and humanitarian aid".

The reasons have not varied over the years: "Our policy is to combat Marxist expansion. In Angola it concerns a Soviet-controlled offensive against all of Southern Africa. Angola is Moscow's springboard," said Malan.

It is also a useful argument for Savimbi to attract support from the West, referring to a coming showdown between the two military forces. Savimbi told reporters last week: "If the Angolan government won the battle, the Soviet Union could use Angola as a base for attacking Namibia."



Even liberal commentators have uncritically accepted the two most dearly held assumptions—that the ultimate aim of the Soviets is to wipe out Unita and to use Angola as a platform for the spread of Soviet influence in the sub-continent.

The red peril is in part a screen which has enabled Pretoria to delay independence for Namibia—and thus the transfer of the frontline to the Orange River—by linking it to the permanent stationing of some 30 000 Cuban troops in Angola.

thus the bombed-out, corpse-strewn thorn scrub which the MPLA and Unita are contesting is an extension of the struggles in Namibia and, ultimately, in South Africa itself.

At the same time the stepped-up Soviet presence in Angola provides hard evidence for the military's belief that they are blocking Soviet expansion. "Under Gorbachev, the Soviet Union does not want to give up its position as a global military power *vis a vis* the United States," says Kuhne. "Angola has become a symbol for the Soviet Union's ability to wage an armed struggle in the Third World.

"Gorbachev as well as the military are very much committed to defending Angola because they feel their credibility as a global power is at stake—and they know this is exactly why people in Washington are pushing for more military aid to Unita, to deal a blow to their military prestige."

Kunhe believes that what the Soviets are doing is some kind of containment of Savimbi: "Their role in Angola is only a limited one. It is not that extensive. They are quite confident that they can defend the MPLA but I doubt if they believe they can completely wipe out Unita."

Behind the shooting is a desire for negotiations in the subcontinent. If Savimbi does come to the negotiating table it would have to be in a substantially weakened state.

But any settlement in Southern Africa—whether it be in Angola or some joint superpower support for war-ravaged Mozambique—would have to take South Africa into account as the central problem.

To this end the Soviet Union continues to support the struggle of the ANC and the end of apartheid but with a crucial shift—the emphasis is increasingly on the political rather than the military component of the struggle.

In the WIP interview Goncharov said that Soviet military support to the ANC depended on the prospects of such an armed struggle. "If we think that is useless we won't give anything," he said.

Kuhne says that while the Soviet Union is not going to press the ANC, the message is that they should "not only rely on armed struggle but they should prepare for dialogue. The end goal of the ANC should be a negotiating table."

Kuhne says that the Soviets' first choice in South Africa would be to do something alongside the US.

A possible first in this area is the joint stand which the US and the Soviet Union took on opposing South Africa's expulsion from the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Dr Philip Nel, director of the Institute for Soviet Studies at the University of Stellenbosch who visited Moscow in August, cautioned on his return that the apparent "softening" of the Soviet line on South Africa could simply be a new way of achieving a socialist revolution.

However, in an interview with THE STAR he said the Soviets appeared to be "preparing the Organization for African Unity to accept Soviet efforts to improve relations with South Africa".

This, he said, may have been the main purpose of the recent visit to Africa by Anatolil Gromyko, the director of the Institute for African Studies in Moscow.

If this is the case, it does not mean that State President PW Botha, and Elize, will soon be attending the Bolshoi ballet in Moscow or sipping vodka with Mikhail and Raisa Gorbachev.

But *glasnost* for Southern Africa does hold extremely important implications for all the major players strewn out across the subcontinent.

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**Campaign Against Black Market Shows Positive Results**

34420013b Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA  
in Portuguese 29 Sep 87 p 12

[Text] The third phase of the offensive against stealing and black marketeering in Benguela is already showing significant results with the arrest of a number of saboteurs and the seizure of a quantity of goods. The saboteurs and goods are now in the hands of the courts.

That information was provided by Geremias Dumbo, secretary of the Department for State and Judicial Organs of the Provincial Party Committee, when he presented a number of saboteurs at the Africa Textile enterprise.

For example, 11 bags of sugar were diverted by the municipal director of EGROSBAL in Lobito, Daniel Noqui, and the head of CONDUTA. They later sold the sugar at a black market price estimated at 800,000 kwanzas.

It is also known that the courts are dealing with compatriots who diverted six 200-liter drums of palm oil for speculative purposes. Those responsible for this crime are a number of officials at the EMPAL plant, who sold the product for 100,000 kwanzas.

Also presented to the workers at the Ministry of Internal Trade was Domingos Dala, deputy supply chief at EMPAL-UEE, who stole five 200-liter drums of palm oil from the warehouse and sold them for 150,000 kwanzas.

The secretary for the Department of Economic, Social, and Productive Development of the Provincial Party Committee, Carlos Martinho, described as positive the results of the work being done on the operational and organizational levels and that being done to influence public opinion.

The party leaders emphasized that the process involves using idle manpower to benefit the sectors of economic, productive, and social life in the province, especially in agriculture so as to strengthen the regional economy and increase food supplies for the inhabitants.

During the meeting held to present the saboteurs, all the workers, defense forces, organs for internal security and order, mass organizations, and social organizations were called upon to play an active part in the campaign with a view to ensuring the social well-being of all.

**French Economic, Political Influence Seen**

34000067a Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English  
7 Oct 87 p 10

[Text] There is a feeling of *la vieille France* on the *Licorne Pacifique*—a large oil tanker permanently moored by the offshore oil rigs operated by Elf-Aquitaine, the French oil group, at the north-western tip of Angola.

At lunchtime, five courses are served up, including *confit de canard* and *pommes de terre a l'ail* as well as the best French cheeses and wines, not to mention the *poire* and cigars at the end.

At dinner on the day I visited the Elf field there was *soup de poisson*, followed by steak and chips and cheese. In Angola, where food and clean water are increasingly rare commodities, the opportunity for this kind of meal does not appear every day.

A little further down the Atlantic coast at Ambriz, the French Bouygues managers are lodged in a charming little compound facing the sea with a floodlit tennis court and a teacher specially flown out from France for the three French children living there.

In Luanda, the capital, the French these days easily outnumber other Western expatriates. At a party at the French embassy, representatives from large French enterprises and the agent for Paribas—"the only Western banker permanently stationed here," I was told—tucked into the *cambembert* and *roquefort*.

In Angola more people speak French than English, and French seems to be fast becoming the second language after Portuguese.

"The French have been descending in force in Angola," remarked a Western diplomat who has been stationed in the country for the past two years. "They seem to be taking the long view on Angola and on this part of Africa in general, unlike some other Western countries."

Indeed, where the Portuguese and the Belgians left in west and central Africa the French have been moving in.

The smell of oil and the region's other bountiful natural resources have increasingly lured the French down the West African coast to countries which for Paris at least seem to be a natural extension of Francophone Africa. And nowhere is this active French African policy more evident than in Angola.

France today is already the second largest supplier of equipment and goods to Angola after the Soviet Union, and well ahead of Brazil and Portugal. The UK is way down in 10th place in the list.

France, Angola's largest Western creditor, is now seeking to boost even further its inroads into Angola and its commercial relations with the Marxist regime of President Jose Edouardo dos Santos.

In fact, President Dos Santos began his recent tour of main European capitals in Paris, seeking to win greater Western support for his country drained by a seemingly endless war against the South African and US-backed Unita rebels of Dr Jonas Savimbi.

France is expected to grant Angola about FF40m (about R1 160m) in bilateral aid over the next two years to help ease the country's chronic economic situation.

It is also expected to back a further R232m in emergency Western aid requested by the Luanda government.

Angola, which has just announced its intention to apply for formal membership of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a first step to trying to reschedule its R8bn external debt, is also expected to ask France to sponsor its IMF application.

At the same time, Paris appears willing to reschedule on a bilateral basis Angola's debt payment arrears with France.

More significantly, Dos Santos appears to have gone out of his way to make an overture to France by his direct intervention to help secure the release last month of Pierre Andre Albertini, the French aid worker jailed in Ciskei. He even went as far as lending his personal jet to the French emissaries negotiating the release of Albertini with Pretoria.

"It was a gesture of goodwill towards France and the West," explained an Angolan government official in Luanda.

Angola's role in the Albertini affair also appears to have eased some recent strains between Paris and Luanda after a number of leading French right-wing politicians, including Francois Leotard, the Culture Minister, and Jacques Chaban Delmas, President of the French National Assembly, received Savimbi in France.

Now it seems to be Savimbi's turn to be angry with France. His Unita guerrillas bombed some equipment of the French Dumez civil engineering and construction group near Luanda and also issued a warning against Elf-Aquitaine.

the French state-controlled oil group, which has a heavy presence in Gabon and Zaire, is by far the biggest of the French operations in Angola. It has been remarkably successful in discovering oil in the offshore Block 3 in the Soyo region, near the Congo River estuary.

The field, 50 percent owned by Elf, is now expected to see its production rise to about 120 000-barrels of high quality crude a day by next year, making it the country's second largest field after the Chevron-Gulf-operated Cabindaa field, whose production is expected to top 250 000b/d by the end of this year.

Total, the other large French oil group, has now also decided to invest in the Angolan offshore, while the Bouygues offshore yard operation continues to supply the continuing and accelerated Angolan oil exploration and development programme.

Angola is currently more than ever dependent on Western technology and expertise for its oil industry, the only sector of the country's battered economy which has been immune to the civil war and the country's main foreign revenue earner.

Angola is also now increasingly eyeing the West, especially France, to diversify its traditional arms supplies beyond its Soviet allies. Indeed, the Angolan Defence Minister said that France had already supplied Dauphin, Gazelle and Alouette helicopters to Luanda.

Negotiations are now understood to be taking place between Angola and French groups, such as Aerospatiale and Thomson, which is already supplying about R100m worth of communications equipment for new contracts totaling between R3.8bn and FF85bn.

"You've got to hand it to the French...they have launched into Angola their formidable African politico-military-industrial machine. There are obvious risks in such an approach, but the payoff can ultimately be huge," remarked a Western businessman in Luanda.

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**Official Visits Military Units in Zaire Province**  
34420013d Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in  
Portuguese 18 Sep 87 p 3

[Text] M'Banza-Congo—Domingos Mutaleno, provincial commissioner of Zaire and alternate member of the MPLA-Labor Party Central Committee, was recently in this city to visit the fighters of the 70th Light Infantry Brigade of the Angolan Armed Forces, who are stationed in this province.

During his meeting with the troops, the party leader emphasized the important role played by FAPLA in liquidating the UNITA puppet gang that is supported by the racist regime in Pretoria. The provincial commissioner of Zaire also appealed to all the fighters to observe military regulations and comply with them completely so as to dignify the Angolan Army.

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**Trade Reorganization Plan Discussed**  
34420013e Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in  
Portuguese 29 Sep 87 p 3

[Text] Benguela—Effective stabilization of the flow of goods in marketing channels can only be achieved through an increase in domestic production and productivity. That was reaffirmed by Angolan Minister of Internal Trade Joaquim Guerreiro Dias during a press conference in Benguela.

Questioned about the matter, the Angolan leader declared that "you can't have products without producing them," and he added that the breakdowns and regional imbalances in marketing channels have also been the result of the extremely difficult situation the country has been experiencing since last year.

Guerreiro Dias emphasized that "for us, national production is more important than waiting for products from outside." He stressed that we must look to the factories and not to the ports, saying that with that in mind, a number of steps are being taken in cooperation with industry to implement that premise.

The Angolan minister of internal trade announced that agricultural marketing may show better results this year. "That is the result of a greater effort to create conditions for organization in almost all the provinces despite a number of problems related to material conditions," he said.

It should be noted that Benguela Province was selected as the site of a pilot experiment with the reorganization of trade at the local level. That reorganization is based on the principles of the Financial-Economic Reorganization (SEF) program.

Joaquim Guerreiro Dias explained that the experiment is aimed at increasing the marketing agent's dynamism, initiative, and interest with respect to the peasant with a view to the reestablishment on a broader scale of the small merchant, who "is extremely important, and since this province is taking very earnest steps, we selected it," he emphasized.

This boost to the small merchant will also make it possible for the forces of state-owned capacity to focus on a specific type of merchant instead of being dispersed and scattered around in a disorganized manner.

"Their concentration may make it possible to improve marketing by taking advantage of the capability of peasants' associations and private activity as marketing agents."

Concerning the chain of distribution from distributor to wholesaler to retailer, the minister of internal trade announced that work was underway to give the retail system a boost. He made it a point to emphasize that besides acting as central collection points for products,

the distribution centers currently serve as temporary transportation agents as well because there is no forwarding business in the country—a sector that should come under the Ministry of Transport.

But he reaffirmed the need to accelerate the movement of goods and to reduce the rate of interruptions as much as possible so as to increase the ability to supply the market.

When urged to comment on the prospects for Angolan tourism, including tourism within the framework of the SADCC, Guerreiro Dias said that investments were aimed at improving hotel management and the organization and design of tourist projects.

He took the opportunity to reaffirm the importance of domestic tourism as a form of recreation for young people and workers. He said: "As far as the SADCC is concerned, that organization is going to work with us to provide support in the area of organizing and designing tourism, which is a precarious area at the moment."

Lastly, Guerreiro Dias said it was important to take advantage of the energy, skills, and initiative of private individuals because, he said in conclusion, "about 51 percent of all trade activity in the country is currently carried on by private individuals, and they have not carried any weight at all in the state structures, although their help and cooperation have been excellent."

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**Journalist Describes Luanda, Lubango Airport, Surroundings**

34190001 Paris LE FIGARO in French 21, 22 Sep 87

[Articles by Edouard Thevenon: "A Ravaged Economy"]

[21 Sep 87 p 6]

[Text] Luanda—Eduardo Dos Santos, president of Angola, arrives in Paris this afternoon where he will pay a 48-hour working visit. He will meet with Francois Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac tomorrow.

Angola, which has been ruined by its fights against the UNITA guerrillas and its social management model, is turning to the West to obtain an oxygen bottle. The Luanda Government needs Paris to push forward its negotiations with the International Monetary Fund. Of its \$3 billion foreign debt, Angola owes \$300 million to France (much more if debt is taken into account). The Elf and Total oil companies have invested somewhat less than \$1 billion in Angola.

Dos Santos will travel to Brussels Wednesday to make an appeal for aid from the countries of Europe. He will ask the EEC for \$116 million in food aid (he received \$93 million worth of food aid in 1986).



The initial contact with the Angolan economy is a rude shock for the unprepared traveler. Angola, in fact, has the triple handicap of being a developing country which the departure of the Portuguese in 1975 suddenly deprived of its cadres; of experiencing a quasi-civil war since that year; and, finally, of having selected the socialist states as a model. The result, in spite of the wealth produced by the discovery of oil in the Gulf of Guinea, is quite exotic but absolutely frightful.

Aboard the Luanda-bound airliner, I was intrigued by the determination displayed by a German businessman who wanted to buy a flashlight from the on-board shop. I understood why when I landed. That is an article which is impossible to find in the country. And, in the President, the capital's main hotel, power outages are practically a daily occurrence. One section of the city's residential district has been without water for a month. The district has to obtain its water supplies by tank trucks.

It is pointless to look for a taxi; there are none. A Frenchman who has lived in the country for a long time explains, "Since independence, 100 Mercedes automobiles have been delivered, but the drivers smashed them up quite a bit...." Apparently, spare parts are not available, and nothing is repaired. Alongside the airport, a piece of land has been converted into a cemetery. Hundreds and hundreds of abandoned trucks lie there.

Formerly, Angola was an exporter of food products. The country now must buy \$350 million worth of food abroad every year to feed itself. The guerrillas are blocking transports. The peasants do not wish to sell their merchandise at the prices set by the government. Because of their inability to sell their merchandise, they only grow what they need for their own subsistence.

### **A Can of Beer, Legal Tender**

Just before independence, coffee production had reached its highest point of 240,000 tons/year. Today, production is just 12,000 tons. The production of diamonds, another great national treasure, is now only 500,000 carats compared to the 2.5 million carats produced at the height of prosperity. During the last 2 years, mines located in the war zone have even stopped production!

Shops, when one can locate them, are empty or nearly so. On Luanda's main street, the Marginale, which runs along the seacoast and where all the airline company offices are located, there are not 10 shops in 2 kilometers. Everywhere one sees the iron shutters closed. An auto spare parts shop has old and rusty ball bearings in its window. A photo shop displays Minolta brochures but not a single camera. The shelves are totally empty.

Obtaining fresh supplies is next to impossible. It is not enough to have money; you also need purchase certificates, which are distributed by businesses, and the merchandise has to be available. To attenuate these difficulties, the oil companies (Elf and Total, particularly), numbered among the rare foreign companies authorized by the government to produce in the country, pay up to 30 percent of their employees' wages in the form of packages containing foodstuffs or articles of prime necessity.

This merchandise in part, moreover, finds its way into the unofficial channels of distribution. Shortages are synonymous with the black market. After attempting to combat these practices, the government has for the past few months elected to tolerate them. Prices are exorbitant. Rice can sell for 50 times its official price. But goods are beginning to circulate. One of the unofficial markets is located back of the Port of Luanda, close to a gigantic dump. There one can find cans of concentrated milk, sugar, margarine (which is sold by the teaspoonful), some vegetables, but no fresh fruit. Five tomatoes sell for 1,000 kwanzas; eight gambas, 2,000 kwanzas; 3 kilos of potatoes, 6,000 kwanzas. A worker's monthly pay is about 12,000 kwanzas.

As a matter of fact, the kwanza has no real value. "at times employees quit their jobs and abandon a large part of the money due them," an official of one oil company observes. The kind of money which is really legal tender in Angola is a can of beer. With 20 cans of beer one can buy a pair of shoes, with a case (24 cans), a new pair of jeans, and with two cases, a roundtrip airline ticket to Rio de Janeiro.

### **Value System Reflects the Real Necessities**

Only a small part of the enormous revenues which oil has been bringing to the Luanda Government for several years (\$1.5 billion expected in 1987) has been used for the country's development up until now. The major share of the revenues has been used to finance the war against the UNITA rebels and South Africa (Soviet arms and Cuban soldiers). And the country's situation has continued to deteriorate.

The drop in oil prices last year—less than \$1 million in revenues in 1986 compared to double that amount the year before—has undoubtedly accelerated the government's realization of the mess it is caught up in, and of the eventual threat to the team in place.

### **The Implacable Mme Cafe**

On 18 August 1987, President Dos Santos officially announced a recovery plan which, in the economic sector, was almost equivalent to crossing over to the West for a Marxist regime: progressive unfreezing of prices, accompanied in the near future by a policy guaranteeing coverage of production costs; the granting

of the fiscal status of merchant to clandestine tradesmen; creation of a private sector of small enterprises, particularly for highway transport.

President Dos Santos also announced his intention to joining the IMF to secure the best terms for the restructuring of his foreign debt: \$4 billion, about one-third of which is owned to Western countries. "We feel that the conditions set by our economic and financial rehabilitation program are just as rigorous as the conditions imposed by the IMF," said Pedro de Castro Van Dunem, the minister responsible for the "productive sector."

At the same time, Luanda wishes to encourage cooperation with Western enterprises with a view to obtaining the expertise the country lacks. The first firm result of this decision: the exploitation of one of the diamond mines, has just been awarded to a Portuguese company with a production-sharing contract, a formula which was so successful in the oil sector.

However, several obstacles may impede this development; the first of which is the opposition of the party's "hardliners." There are many who are opposed to this approach. The MPLA has given rise to the creation of a "nomenklatura" which puts up with the restrictions very well. Government functionaries and top cadres have access to special, properly stocked shops. However, the president appears to be determined. In Luanda, the dismissal of one of the principal opponents to opening up is already being taken for granted: the implacable Mme Mambo Cafe, minister of economic and social affairs.

The other principal obstacle is the war. Continuation of the fighting with South Africa and the struggle against UNITA justify the presence of about 2,000 Soviet advisers. These advisers, if we can judge by results, are much less concerned with the economic development of Angola. They have concentrated their attention on the state's army and apparatus.

It is difficult to see how the USSR could countenance a "deviation" (derapage) which would counterbalance its influence. Angola is a key position in Africa for the USSR. On the other hand, it is difficult to see how Paris could agree to become the ally (even simply objective) of Moscow in the fight against the anticommunist maquis of UNITA who are receiving official support from the United States. Under these circumstances, cooperation with Luanda calls for an extremely delicate maneuver.

[22 Sep 87 p 2]

[Text] Luanda—"In 1978, I used to drive around by myself in the Moxico region. There was no UNITA. Today, that is impossible." This young Angolan cadre, who is a Luanda Government sympathizer, expresses himself in impeccable French—there are 600,000 French-speaking persons in the country. The region about which he is speaking is now controlled by Jonas

Savimbi's rebels. "If UNITA has been able to develop," our speaker goes on to say, "it is because we have made mistakes, particularly economic mistakes." Since the president of the very Marxist People's Republic of Angola, Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, did himself bring into question—in a resounding speech delivered on 18 August 1987—the management of state enterprises and the direction of the national economy, alleging that the development of private family enterprises is no longer prohibited (a discreet bit of self-criticism). Angola a badly managed state? The heart of the capital, Luanda, presents a symbolic recapitulation of the country's situation. In the center of town is the Ministry of War. An enormous building on the floors of which the Soviet military advisers are housed. Close by are the residences of the commander of the Cuban troops who came to the country to lend a hand to the Angolan Army, but not for free. In front, facing the sea, like a rocket pointed toward the sky, sits the future mausoleum of the founder of the Angolan Republic, "our immortal guide," Agostinho Neto. In spite of the deep cuts in the budget, this work site has priority. On the other side of the ministry, one can see the framework of a 15-story apartment building which is well advanced. Its construction was stopped in 1975 when independence came. Later, it appears that no one, not even a Russian expert, thought of completing it.

The poor performance of the economy, the shortage of food products, and the "satiety" provoked among the people by an omnipresent bureaucracy played as decisive a role for Jonas Savimbi's supporters as did the arms received from South Africa and the United States.

### An Ordinary Insecurity

A curfew is in force in Luanda from midnight until 0500 hours. It is not very strictly enforced. But almost every night one can hear a few bursts of Kalashnikovs. "A patrol that is firing to reassure itself," a French inhabitant of the city comments. "But now and then, they pick up some dead men," another resident adds.

During the day life is normal. Few troops are to be seen and one does not feel any tension. However, as soon as one leaves the principal cities, insecurity becomes the rule. Fifteen days ago a work site of the Dumez French public works company was attacked in Bengo Province about 40 kilometers north of the capital. In spite of a guard of about 20 men, the machines were destroyed.

The history of the Benguela railway recapitulates quite well the tactics employed by the guerrillas and the problems encountered by the Angolan Army in protecting communications channels. This train once linked the copper mines of Zambia and the southern part of Zaire with the port of Lobito, crossing 1,347 kilometers of Angolan territory. A single stretch of barely 400 kilometers between Benguela and Huambo is still kept in service. And at what price.

"We make three runs a month," a railway official explains. At times four or five locomotives are damaged during a run by remote control mines. Each attack causes the death and wounding of trainmen. Passenger traffic ended in 1978. We get through, but it may now take up 60 hours when normally it would take 6." The mines, which are often used on roads also, are the abomination of this conflict. Today Angola most certainly has several million one-legged persons.'

Farther to the south, we leave the guerrillas and run into the war. Lubango is the important air base closest to the Namibian border. The runway is bordered by hangar-blockhouses harboring MiG 23s and fighter Suhois. Every morning a huge Aeroflot Antonov brings in or takes out a cargo of materiel or soldiers, often Cuban. The Cuban contingent (25,000 to 30,000 men, according to U.S. estimates) occupy important positions in this sector. But, in principle, the Cuban contingent does not take part in the fighting and is not to intervene except in case of a veritable South African invasion.

The city is a seaside resort planted with superb jacarandas. The Soviet instructors are lodged in the "Grand Hotel da Huila." They can be seen every morning, punctually awaiting the service cars: camouflage uniforms, pistols at their belts, but without insignia of any kind indicating rank or unit. According to Lieutenant Colonel Luis Faceira, who commands the fifth military region, these advisers operate up to brigade level (somewhat fewer than 2,000 men). He adds, laughing: "I, too, have my adviser." What is the mission of Lt Col Faceira? To keep the South African troops stationed in Namibia from conducting raids into Angolan territory: raids which, he explains, are designed to resupply UNITA troops with military materiel. South Africa, one can well imagine, would offer another explanation. Angola is harboring and supporting units of SWAPO (South West African Peoples Organization) which are fighting against the South African presence in Namibia.

This double conflict, war on the border, guerrillas in the interior, has now been going on for 12 years. An Angolan source estimates that the conflict has produced 60,000 dead, 50,000 wounded, and has caused damage estimated at \$12 billion. The Luanda Government is devouring in this conflict from one-half to two-thirds of the revenues produced by the oil discovered on the Atlantic coast. Angola is on the brink of ruin. Famine threatens.

8143/06662

#### **Cuban Firm To Resume Apartment Construction in Huambo**

34420013a Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 20 Sep 87 p 12

[Text] Huambo—The Cuban Civil Construction Enterprise (UNECA) will soon resume its construction work on a residential zone consisting of about 400 apartments in this city. The work was abandoned in March 1983.

The above information was provided to Provincial Commissioner Marcolino Moco during an assistance and inspection visit he made to the provincial facilities of the Ministry of Construction on Friday.

The delegate for construction, Benedito Manuel, reported on some of the main difficulties hampering operations by that construction enterprise, chief among them the lack of raw materials and the absence of skilled personnel.

In discussing the system for road and bridge construction outside the town, Benedito Manuel mentioned the lack of a flatbed truck for transporting machinery to the areas where it is needed and the shortage of crushed rock and cement as being the sector's chief difficulties.

He also said that the engineering sector in question needs a direct investor to finance the projects that are to be carried out.

#### **Red Cross Office**

An office of the Angolan Red Cross (CVA) was inaugurated recently in the municipality of Ukuma, about 90 kilometers from the city of Huambo, during a ceremony presided over by the provincial delegate for that humanitarian organization, Luciano Silvestre.

The purpose of the CVA office, which includes a medical station, is to assist persons displaced by the war and living in the municipalities of Ukuma, Longonjo, and Tchingenga as well as members and blood donors.

11798

#### **Children, Elderly Reportedly Returning Under Clemency Policy**

34420013c Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 29 Sep 87 p 12

[Text] Sumbe—About 40 people who had been living in the jungle as captives of UNITA's armed bandits recently presented themselves to party and government authorities in the city of Wako Kungo.

The returnees, most of them old people or children, complained of the bad treatment to which they had been subjected and said that disorganization was growing worse among the bandits.

The individuals in question, who are now benefiting from the clemency policy decreed 9 years ago by the late President Antonio Agostinho Neto, will receive land, farm implements, and seed so that they can make their contribution in the agricultural sector.

11798



### **Voter Registration Figures Explained**

34000081c Nairobi *THE WEEKLY REVIEW* in  
English 9 Oct 87 p 1

[Letter from the Editor, Hilary Ng'weno, Editor in Chief]

[Text] The voter registration exercise is over, with six million Kenyans registered. Compared with the 5.5 million registered in 1979 for the national elections of that year, this figure may seem rather modest representing as it does, a rise of about 10 percent in 8 years, when Kenya's population has risen by more than 20 percent during the same period. It is also lower than the 7.2 million figure on the register for the 1983 elections. But in reality, it is a very commendable figure indeed. The population increase is all in the non-voting children's age-groups. In terms of percentage increase in voters actually registered between elections, it bears out the general trend since independence. More to the point, it is within 82 percent of the estimate of voters forecast by government statisticians as likely to register, a figure slightly higher than was the case in previous forecasts. In respect of the 1983 elections, there was no national voter registration exercise. Instead, the existing register was revised, but not so efficiently, with many voters being simultaneously registered at different places and names of dead persons and those who would not have bothered to register in a national exercise being retained on the register. The consequence was the artificially very low voter turn-out for the 1983 elections. Now what is left is for the country to get on with the elections. Ideally, the ruling party, Kanu, should hold its elections where these need to be held, especially in the newly-created constituencies, within the next month or so. Then we should move on to the nominations and final elections. Hopefully, Kanu will in the meantime look afresh at the issue of how much a candidate needs from the nomination exercise to be declared elected unopposed. The party has opted for a 70 percent figure. There is, however, every indication that the public would prefer people being declared unopposed if, and only if, they have 100 percent of the support of voting Kanu members during the nomination exercise in their respective constituencies. The will of the people should prevail.

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### **Union Leaders Oppose Merger Proposal**

34000083 Nairobi *DAILY NATION* in English  
12 Oct 87 p 20

[Article by Francis Raymond: "Unionists Oppose Merger Proposal"]

[Text] The proposal to merge small trade unions with bigger ones will lead to industrial chaos and should be opposed by Kenyan workers, a unionist said yesterday.

Mr Wafula wa Musamia, the general secretary of the Kenya Quarry and Mine Workers Union, said the workers would only accept the proposal if Parliament amended the Trade Union Act and a clause in the constitution that grants the freedom to associate.

The proposal was made at Kisumu last week by the Minister for Labour, Mr Peter Okondo.

The minister also said that unions which broke away from others due to personality differences would have to be reunited.

Mr Musamia addressed a press conference in Nairobi yesterday accompanied by the general secretary of the Banking, Insurance and Finance Union (BIFU), Mr Isaiah Kubai. He charged that the proposal was the brainchild of the national officials of the Central Organisation of Trade Unions.

Mr Musamia claimed that he had the support of 15 out of the 30 registered trade unions. He said the "unpopular present Cotu leadership was out to cause chaos and confusion among the Kenyan workers."

Mr Musamia and Mr Kubai claimed that the idea of merging small unions with big ones was hatched jointly by Cotu and the Kenya Federation of Employers, with Mr Okondo's blessing.

"We will oppose arrangements, agreements and manoeuvres aimed at frustrating the workers. We do not want industrial chaos in the country," they said.

The two unionists claimed that since the Cotu elections late last year, unions which opposed the present national leadership had been harassed by FKE, Cotu and the Minister for Labour. The aim, they alleged was to stifle opposition in Cotu.

They said the Trade Union Act Cap 233, allowed registration of a trade union provided it had more than six members.

The registration and amalgamation of unions was governed by the law and the constitution. Unless these were changed, the situation would remain unchanged.

The unionists claimed that the proposed merger would only benefit a few individuals.

Mr Musamia and Mr Kubai said the growth of the economy called for the expansion of trade unions and "whether some people like it or not, the so-called small unions are legally registered and they are here to stay."

The unionists said the more than one million Kenyan workers need quality union leadership to realise their expectations.

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**Ouko Discusses Industrial Development**  
34000081a Nairobi DAILY NATION in English  
14 Oct 87 p 14

[Article: "Ouko: Sh480m Set Aside to Improve Industrial Base"]

[Text] The Government has set aside Sh480 million to improve industrial infrastructure throughout the country, the Minister for Industry, Dr Robert Ouko, has said.

He said the money would be used in towns with a population of 2,000-4,000 people which would create more jobs in the rural areas than in the urban centres.

He said on Monday the greatest task is to revive and sustain economic growth at 5.6 percent a year.

Dr Ouko told top executives attending a workshop on job creation in Mombasa that the economic growth would have to go side by side with a rise in employment.

The one-week workshop is at the Hotel Inter-Continental and is organised by the International Labour Organisation and the Federation of Kenya Employers. It is attended by about 60 executives who include company chairmen, managing directors, mayors and town clerks. It was opened on Monday by the Minister for Labour, Mr Peter Okondo.

Dr Ouko said on Monday that the task of job creation facing Kenya was set out in Sessional Paper No 1 of 1986. It is predicted in the paper that Kenya would have a workforce of 14 million, 6.5 million more than in 1984.

Dr Ouko said that the 6.5 million new workers have been born and that for them to get jobs 13 years from now, without a rise in unemployment, twice as many jobs will have to be found in the same period.

To bring down unemployment to 10 percent of the labour force (or 1.4 million people) by the turn of the century, nearly six million jobs need to be created with 300,000 in 1987. This should rise to more than 500,000 a year by the end of the century.

An important source of jobs will be the large and small enterprises especially those which have survived the first difficult year and have growth potential.

"The district as a rural frame, is going to be our theatre of operations. Already, Government has set aside some [British pounds]24 million for industrial infrastructure improvements in the districts," Dr Ouko said.

He said that the Ministry of Industry was making a major effort to direct industrial growth in the rural areas.

Industrial committees are to be established in every district as specialised sub-committees of District Development Committees. Industrial development officers are

to be sent in the districts and local authorities would be asked to set aside land for industrial development through the industrial committees.

The Ministry of Industry would concentrate on the small enterprises or jua kalis. These are to be developed into future entrepreneurs, Dr Ouko told the workshop.

District industrial development officers would also monitor any harassment by local authorities. They would ask the authorities to review tax and site regulations that hold up the development of small businesses.

The dissemination of information on raw material supplies, investment and market opportunities would be institutionalised, he said and appealed to the DDCs and local authorities to issue small tenders in favour of the small businessmen and jua kali artisans.

The minister said the incentives would have to boost exports and reduce the protection of inefficient import substitution industries.

There are more than 560 medium to large enterprises, 720 small-scale and 1,600 micro enterprises, employing 160,000 people.

He said that in order to reduce long bureaucratic procedures faced by new investors, the Government has sanctioned a centralised investment Promotion Centre. An investment process coordinated by the Investment committee has been set up to implement the process. The committee would coordinate all investment matters authorisations, registrations, licences and other affairs.

The minister said a monopolies and prices department had been established to take over the work of the price control department. It is expected to foster increased competition.

Foreign investors are now permitted to borrow locally all the tariff duties on imports and equipments in addition to borrowing from local financial institutions amounts proportional to the share of equity owned by Kenyan citizens.

Dr Ouko said approval has been given for Kenya to join the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency which assists investors. The agency will issue guarantees against non-commercial risks. The guarantees provided to foreign investors under Kenya's Constitution and under the Foreign Investment Protection Act will thus be strengthened.

**Cotton Bill To Be Discussed in Parliament**  
34000081b Nairobi *THE WEEKLY REVIEW* in  
English 16 Oct 87 p 39

[Article: "Cotton Board—Monopoly on the Way Out"]

[Text] A bill seeking to reduce the monopoly of the Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board over internal production and marketing of cotton is due to be discussed in parliament during the current session. The Cotton Bill (1987) which was tabled in parliament in July of this year will establish a new parastatal to be known as the Cotton Board with no legislative monopoly powers to make it the sole buyer and seller of the crop. The new organisation's functions will be limited to planning and monitoring cotton growing, licensing and controlling cotton ginners and dealers and controlling the quality of the cotton produced. In addition, the new

board will act as the exclusive importer and exporter of cotton, and advise the Ministry of Agriculture on cotton pricing. The Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board was formed in 1955 but despite having absolute powers over production, purchase and marketing of a crop whose demand in Kenya is said to be inelastic, the board has achieved little in alleviating the problems in the industry. The desire of the government has been to increase cotton production to supply both the local and the export market but production has continued to decline over the years. Kenya has a thriving textile industry and it was hoped that the industry would stimulate increased cotton production; the country has not been able to export cotton since 1979. In 1985, farmers produced 38,000 tonnes of cotton but the level declined sharply by 34 percent last year to only 25,000 tonnes.

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**Expansion of Coal Production Planned**

34000067b Johannesburg *THE STAR* in English  
13 Oct 87 p 17

[Text] Malawi's Department of Mines is initiating studies to expand production of coal from the Kaziwiziwa mine in the Rumphi district to possibly 50 000 tons a year.

About R5 million have been budgeted for the coal project, most of it to be granted and lent by the United Nations' Capital Development Fund.

Expanded coal output would meet current total consumer needs and help to eliminate coal imports, which last year were nearly 28 000 tons, according to the Mining Journal of London.

Malawi's domestic coal output last year was about 11 000 tons, obtained almost entirely from the Kaziwiziwa mine using handheld mechanical pick hammers and wheelbarrows for transport of the coal to the mine adit portal.

Present plans envisage the use of blasting to free the medium-hard bituminous coal, and a coal cutter. A coal-crushing and screening plant will be installed at nearby Phwezi, which will produce the quantities and size ranges required by consumers—mostly for the cement, brewing and textile industries.

The delivered price of the coal should be competitive with imported coal, now obtained from Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

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## POLITICAL

### **Bophuthatswana Political Realities on Eve of Elections Discussed**

**Mangope Discourages Opposition**  
34000078 Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL  
in English 23-29 Oct 87 pp 14-15

[Article by Patrick Laurence]

[Text] President Lucas Mangope's Bophuthatswana Democratic Party seeks a mandate for a third term of office when voters in his nominally-independent state go to the polls next week.

But when voters cast their ballot papers on Tuesday they will do so without knowing the findings of the judicial inquiry into the Winterveld shootings last year.

Eleven people were shot dead and 70 injured when Bophuthatswana police opened fire on a crowd in the Winterveld (a vast squatter area north of Pretoria) on March 26, 1986, in the bloodiest event in Bophuthatswana's short history as a theoretically sovereign state.

Described as a "massacre" by newspapers throughout the world, the shootings constituted a severe and perhaps fatal setback to Mangope's quest for world recognition for Bophuthatswana.

Mangope ordered an inquiry into the shooting, mandating Edgar Smith, a former attorney-general in Ian Smith's Rhodesia and now a judge of the Bophuthatswana Supreme Court, to conduct it.

But, in the view of lawyers representing the bereaved families, Mangope then pre-empted the findings of the commission by promoting Andrew Molope, the officer who gave the orders to open fire on the crowd at the Winterveld football ground, from colonel to brigadier. Molope's deputy was similarly promoted, his rank being raised from major to colonel.

Mangope's action prompted counsel for the families to withdraw from the proceedings, describing it as a "slap in the face" to their clients and to their feelings.

Molope did not live to enjoy his rank. He was gunned down by an assassination squad in June last year.

The Winterveld is situated in the Odi-Moretele district, the most densely populated region of Bophuthatswana. It has long been an area of resistance to Mangope's rule and, indeed, to the very notion of an independent Bophuthatswana. The Bophuthatswana flag was once burnt by irate Winterveld residents.

The Winterveld shootings are of central importance to political debate in the territory and to the reputation of Mangope's administration. But Smith's report will not be released until after the elections.

Bophuthatswana Secretary for Information Jerry Read told the WEEKLY MAIL that the report had been presented to Mangope early last week, adding that it would not be released publicly until after Bophuthatswana's 10th independence anniversary celebrations on December 4, 5 and 6. Mangope and his lieutenants want to study it fully first, Read said.

Mangope's governing Bophuthatswana Democratic Party (BDP) is opposed by two parties: the newly formed Progressive People's Party (PPP) and the older Seoposengwe Party (SP).

The BDP won a clean sweep in the first post-independence election in 1982, capturing all 72 popularly elected seats, as well as winning the 24 seats filled by representatives of the tribally-based regional authorities.

The 1982 election made Bophuthatswana a *de facto* one-party state and doubts have been expressed about the viability of opposition parties. They are strengthened by allegations of obstructionism and harassment.

Freedom of association is not guaranteed in Bophuthatswana. Under its Internal Security Act, permission must be sought from the Minister of Law and Order 14 days in advance for meetings of more than 20 people.

Opposition leaders have charged that the Minister of Law and Order, currently Mangope himself, has used that power to curtail and restrict opposition parties. An attempt by the SP to hold a meeting in Bophuthatswana's capital of Mabatho was thus thwarted. The SP is contesting nine seats only.

The PPP was formed in 1983 under the leadership of a former Mangope man, Rocky Malebana-Metsing. But it was only registered as a political party in June 1987.

It has promised to uphold the right to criticise the government of the day and to hold public meetings without fear of harassment, implying that these rights—which are theoretically protected by Bophuthatswana's Bill of Rights—are denied by Mangope's government.

The PPP is contesting 54 of the 72 popularly elected seats. It has provided the election with an element of interest which the older SP was not capable of evoking.

But even if the incumbent BDP suffers an unexpected setback on Tuesday, Mangope will stay on as president: having served as president for the first seven years of independence from 1977 to 1984, he was re-elected for a further seven-year term in 1984.



The constitution was changed at the same time, providing for the direct election of the president by popular vote rather than through National Assembly members serving as an electoral college.

Three key Cabinet Ministers, all whites, will not be seeking election: Minister of State, ex-Rhodesian Rowan Cronje, Finance Minister, British-born Leslie Young, and Minister of Defence, former SADF officer Hennie Riekert. All were nominated to the Bophuthatswana cabinet and the National Assembly by Mangope under a special enabling clause in the constitution.

The election takes place amidst an ongoing controversy over citizenship, the roots of which go back to the Status of Bophuthatswana Act, the South African law which formally bestowed "independence" on Bophuthatswana on 6 December 1977.

Under the 1977 law all Tswana-speaking blacks, including those living outside Bophuthatswana in white-designated South Africa, were stripped of South African citizenship and declared citizens of Bophuthatswana.

Mangope protested at the time, insisting that Batswana in South Africa—there were 1.2-million of them in 1980—had the right to be South Africans.

His government promptly passed its own Citizenship Act, enabling Batswana living in South Africa to renounce the Bophuthatswana citizenship conferred on them.

South Africa, however, countered at the time by setting a condition: Batswana who renounced Bophuthatswana citizenship would have to accept the citizenship of another of the "black homelands".

But by 1986 the wheel had moved the full cycle: South Africa was prepared to restore full South African citizenship to a small portion—1.7-million out of the 8 million—of the blacks who had been deprived of it, and to negotiate a form of dual citizenship for the rest.

Mangope, however, was not interested in dual citizenship: Batswana had to choose between Bophuthatswana or South African citizenship.

He insisted that Batswana who wanted to exercise their option of regaining South African citizenship should formerly renounce Bophuthatswanan citizenship.

In a statement after South Africa had passed the Restoration of South African Citizenship Act, Mangope made some sharp remarks about South African Batswana who, he said, professed to want to have nothing to do with Bophuthatswana.

"We need to know those people who do not want to identify themselves with us," he said.

Mangope charged that many South African Batswana who publicly denigrated Bophuthatswana actually benefited from its existence by using its facilities.

They sent their children to school in Bophuthatswana, he said. They bought land in Bophuthatswana, divided it into small lots, made it available to squatters at a profit, and thus created slums for which Bophuthatswana was blamed, he added.

"There are well-respected Tswana South Africans who live in Soweto and draw rents from slums they have helped to create for personal gain and, at the same time, they publicly denounce us and our efforts to lead decent dignified lives free from apartheid."

Sheena Duncan, of the Black Sash, and Geoff Budlender, of the Legal Resources Centre, pin-point Bophuthatswana's insistence on a formal renunciation of Bophuthatswana citizenship as a key factor behind South Africa's slow processing of nearly 260 000 applications by Batswana for South African citizenship.

Another factor may be the determination of white South African bureaucrats to keep the number of blacks who regain their South African citizenship to a minimum—thus theoretically minimising the risk of the "swamping" of the white minority. Bophuthatswana's stand facilitates that end. As President PW Botha remarked in 1986: "South Africa does not grant citizenship unilaterally to the citizens of other independent states." Whatever the rationale or motivation of Bophuthatswana's citizenship policy, Budlender contends that it is not required by the Restoration of Citizenship Act.

Duncan found that people are fearful it will lead to confiscation of homes they have built in Bophuthatswana—some of which were there long before Bophuthatswana became "independent"—or to victimisation of their dependents.

They sense a vindictive undertone in Mangope's words.

"We insist upon knowing exactly who is throwing their lot in with us and who is not," he said. "We are not interested in those who choose to be foreigners and use us from afar." For many older Batswana Mangope's stand has placed them in an unenviable position.

Repossession of their lost South African citizenship means that their monthly pensions nearly treble, rising from the R40 paid by Bophuthatswana to the R117 made by South Africa.

But if it entails loss of a family house in Bophuthatswana, it is a heavy price.

They are not Soweto grandees, masking profiteering in Bophuthatswana with hypocritical denunciation of bantustans.

They are simple people struggling to make ends meet. For them Bophuthatswana citizenship means lower pensions and vulnerability to the influx controls of the Aliens Act.

### Plight of Unemployed, Pensioners

34000078 Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 23-29 Oct 87 p 14

[Article by Vusi Gunene]

[Text] Unemployed workers and pensioners in Bophuthatswana have a host of complaints against the "homeland" government's administration of the payment of benefits.

In Zone 15, Ga-rankuwa, workers line the administration offices every day in search of their Unemployment Insurance Fund cheques—essential to their survival.

When the WEEKLY MAIL visited the Advice Office in Ga-rankuwa Zone 3, despairing workers spoke of their common problem: the hopelessly irregular payment of UIF benefits, and interminable visits to the administration offices.

Most said they were unable to understand delays in the processing of their applications by Bophuthatswana's Department of Manpower.

Despite repeated requests for comment from the department by the WEEKLY MAIL, no response was forthcoming.

Several workers—many of whom held out no hope for new jobs—said they were breadwinners who had been forced to depend entirely on the UIF pay-outs.

They charged the Bophuthatswana authorities with "maladministration", even accusing some officials of "squandering" funds.

William Monageng, 65, applied for his UIF in 1984, after leaving a job with Hudson Tyres in Pretoria. He had worked for the firm for 35 years and received only R300 from the UIF.

"I visit the administration offices in Zone 15 at the end of every month, and a lot of us go back home without the expected cheque," he said. "Ever since I submitted my application in 1984, I haven't heard from the Department of Manpower—and there hasn't been a letter notifying me that my UIF money has been exhausted."

Monageng said he had applied for government pension money on the grounds of ill-health and old-age, but was told to "come back later in the year".

A spokesperson for the Advice Office said 80 percent of all clients came seeking assistance in claiming their UIF money; while a number of pensioners were also struggling to get their payments—primarily because they were non-Tswanas, or awaiting Bophuthatswanan citizenship.

"Every day of the week we encounter problems of workers not able to get their UIF moneys. Some of these people have been coming here for almost a year now," said the spokesperson. "Written and telephonic inquiries sometimes take months before the relevant department responds. The payouts are so irregular that sometimes we think the department might be experiencing a serious financial backlog.

"The administration offices have even gone to the extent of referring some of the unemployed workers to the Advice Office—thus lessening their work."

"The Advice Office is in possession of a list of pensioners who applied for their payments in November 1984 and only had their requests approved in July this year.

Pensioners in the slum areas of Winterveld and Maboloka also ascribe their difficulties to maladministration—which began, they say, after Bophuthatswana opted for "independence" in 1977. Their incorporation into the "homeland" prompted a long battle over their pension funds, as neither the South African nor the Bophuthatswanan governments wanted to be held responsible.

According to the Advice Office spokesperson, "we still find some officials telling pensioners to claim Bophuthatswana citizenship though a law that has long been scrapped.

"We do not know why some of these officials should still stick to the citizenship requirement."

As in other areas of Bophuthatswana, there have also been allegation of administrative officials using their positions to coerce inhabitants into supporting the ruling bophuthatswana Democratic Party in the forthcoming elections.

"We've had reports that some of the pensioners were forced to have voting registration stamps in their IDs," said the Advice Office spokesperson, "and this has threatened some who feel they might lose their pension moneys."

The pensioners have allegedly been promised transportation by bus to the polling stations and "given pamphlets with photographs of people they are supposed to vote for", said the spokesperson. "Our belief is that if the election is a democratic process, people should not be coerced. What is happening therefore contradicts Bophuthatswana's Bill of Rights."

### Twenty-One on Death Row

34000078 Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL  
in English 23-29 Oct 87 p 14

[Text] Twenty-one people are awaiting execution at the Bophuthatswana Central Prison—better known as Rooigrond—according to prison sources. Twenty of the convicts are males, and one is a female. Their crimes are said to include murder, intent to do grievous bodily harm, and attempted murder. The murder charges include indictments for “necklacing”.

Since “independence” in 1977, a total of 21 people have been executed at Rooigrond—thus, if appeals fail, the number will soon double. The highest number of people previously executed in one year in Bophuthatswana was ten, in 1985.

The outcome of the current appeals of five of the condemned is not yet known. Among the appeals to be heard next year are those of Daisy Modise, Johannes Chauke and Thomas Makhubela—all of the Moretele district—who were sentenced to death in May this year for “participation in ‘necklace’ killings”.

### Plight of Modderspruit Community

34000078 Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL  
in English 23-29 Oct 87 pp 14-15

[Article by John Perlman]

[Text] When pensioners in the Bophuthatswana community of Modderspruit went to collect their money last month, they were told to gather again in three days' time. They did—only to be told by the chief of the Bapo Ba Mogale Tribal Authority, Kgosi Bob Mogale that they would lose their pensions if they did not vote for the ruling Bophuthatswana Democratic Party in next week's elections.

The pensioners of Modderspruit don't have a vote. Like all others in the community—non-Tswanas who have not yet received Bophuthatswana citizenship despite some having applied as far back as 1980—they are not allowed to participate in the election.

To threaten people in order to capture a vote they don't have is certainly a peculiar pursuit; but then for ten years the people of Modderspruit have been leading strange and difficult lives. Modderspruit became part of Bophuthatswana in 1977. “We weren't notified,” said community leader Obed Nyundu, “We just suddenly found everything run by Bophuthatswana.”

Inhabitants of Modderspruit had few historical ties with the areas of land which the South African government was cobbling together to create its second “independent homeland”. They were there because of a tornado—which had ripped through the Albertynsvlei Saquatters Camp, south of Johannesburg, in 1951. After housing the survivors at the Lenz military camp for seven months,

authorities resettled the 12 families on the Modderspruit Trust Farm, east of Brits. A year later they were joined by a further hundred families removed from Mooiplaas, a squatter area outside Pretoria.

As non-Tswanas in the “Tswana homeland”, the people of Modderspruit should enjoy the protection of Bophuthatswana's Declaration of Fundamental Rights, to wit: “All people shall be equal before the law, and no one may because of his sex, his descent, his race, his language, his origin or his beliefs be favoured or prejudiced.” This, say the people of Modderspruit, has not been their experience.

Their conflict with the “homeland” authorities has not yet reached the levels seen in Winterveld, Makanayang and other areas, where non-Tswana people (usually in the majority), have simply packed up and left.

“But,” said Nyundu, “schools, clinics—everything we apply for, the government rejects.

“We built, with the people of Bapo, a secondary school in 1978,” he said. “But when a Modderspruit child goes there they say ‘you must repay the building funds’.

A South African government proclamation of 1958 “defined the boundaries of the area of the Bapo tribe”, and made Modderspruit part of the Bapo ba Mogale Tribal Authority. According to Nyundu, residents of Modderspruit do not regard themselves as “the people of a chief”. Nevertheless, he said, “people don't mind being in Bophuthatswana if they can have their rights.”

The Bapo ba Mogale Tribal Authority, he says, refuses to address their grievances, denies access to its offices and, at the end of last year, removed water tanks, the machinery of three water pumps and the engine of a borehole.

The Bophuthatswana authorities have also hampered Modderspruit residents' attempts to do things for themselves. The village committee—which had already raised money to build a primary school in Modderspruit—was warned last year to stop its work.

Modderspruit's difficulties with the Tribal Authority have been the subject of commissions of inquiry in 1985 and 1986; neither of which produced any findings of which the Modderspruit people are aware. The community's proposal that they form themselves into a separate local authority is still in the hands of President Mangope. Their citizenship applications are still pending.

“We work in South Africa, and our Unemployment Insurance Fund money gets sent to the Bophuthatswana government,” said Nyundu. “Without citizenship we can't collect it. When you apply for it, you can stay five or ten years. They don't tell you anything, if it's been refused or what. We just want them to tell us what they want,” he said.



Modderspruit's problems are a source of great concern to nearby Machakaneng—one of three Transvaal villages scheduled for incorporation (and quiet removal) into Bophuthatswana in a bill passed by South Africa's tricameral parliament last year.

The people of Machakaneng live on land originally bought in the 1870s by African people living in the area, most of the Tswanas. But the Restoration of Citizenship Act and the new Identification Act of last year (promoted as a "reform" of influx control), has placed them in a no-win situation.

Most Machakaneng residents—some of whom had already been ordered in 1977 to get Bophuthatswana identity documents—took the new dispensation at its word and applied for "South African" IDs.

If incorporated, they would fall foul of Bophuthatswana legislation which disallows dual citizenship, and regards any Bophuthatswana citizen applying for "South African citizenship" as having renounced bophuthatswana citizenship—and liable for deportation as illegal aliens.

If, on the other hand, they took out Bophuthatswana documents, their right to work outside the "homeland's" borders would be governed by the Aliens Act—as if they were citizens of Swaziland and Malawi. Their employers would then have to get permits from the South African department of Home Affairs.

The Machakaneng community has been under threat of removal for 20 years. Tenants were removed under police guard in 1983; and in the same year an investigation began into the ownership of the Machakaneng farm—which the government eventually confirmed was with a view to expropriation. At the end of 1985, Minister of Development and Land Affairs Ben Wilkens informed the people of Machakaneng that they would not be removed, but would be incorporated into Bophuthatswana.

The community wrote in reply: "Mr Wilkens, although the news in your letter is very good, there are still some things that worry us. We do not want to be part of Bophuthatswana at all. We are not interested in being in a homeland and want to remain under the central government. We have seen the suffering of our neighbours who live in Bophuthatswana and do not want to end up like them.

In a brief reply six months later, Wilkens said the Machakaneng people's request could "unfortunately not be favourably considered", as agreement had already been reached between the presidents of South Africa and Bophuthatswana.

"Bophuthatswana is a recent thing but this land started long ago," said one resident. "On the title deeds of our lands is there any name Mangope? Is there any name Bophuthatswana? We don't want to see him and we don't want him talking for us."

### **Mangope Warns Media**

34000078 Johannesburg *THE WEEKLY MAIL*  
in English 23-29 Oct 87 p 15

[Text] Bophuthatswana's President Lucas Mangope has warned the local media not to support the opposition in the forthcoming elections.

Mangope, leader of the ruling Bophuthatswana Democratic Party, apparently summoned the editor of the Mafikeng-based MAIL to his office, and told him to be wary of giving publicity to the opposition parties. The BDP is being opposed by the recently-formed Progressive Peoples' Party and the Seopasengwe Party.

Mangope reportedly accused the editor, Lesly Sehume, of being "one of the people who want to break apart the (Bophuthatswana) government". Sehume responded by saying that the MAIL was "not subsidised by the government", and further alleged that government officials repeatedly failed to inform his reporters of meetings and newsworthy events.

BOP-TV and Radio reporters have also allegedly been warned by the president to avoid publicising the BDP's rival. One journalist, who asked not to be named, told the WEEKLY MAIL that there was no choice but compliance, because "we are under the government". Others said they fear dismissal if they do not respond to Mangope's warning.

In another development relating to media coverage of the election, PPP leader Peter Malebana-Metsing has announced his intention to take legal steps against Bop Minister of Broadcasting KC Sehume. According to PPP secretary Amos Mataboge, voters in Bop were receiving a "one-sided story" from their own broadcasting services. He claimed that people from the Madikwe and Odi-Moretele districts were boycotting news programmes on Bop-TV and Radio "because they know that they are going to hear Mangope".

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### **Survey Shows 63 Percent of White Adults Disapprove of Dakar Talks**

34000073b Johannesburg *THE CITIZEN* in English  
19 Oct 87 p 11

[Text] A survey of White adults in South Africa has shown that 63,3 percent disapprove of the Dakar talks with the African National Congress and only 19,6 percent approve.



The great majority of South African Whites see the talks as "negotiation with terrorists and murderers", according to an August poll by Market and Opinion Surveys for Rapport.

The survey would appear to have significant consequences for the independent movement in South Africa, which split into two factions following the inclusion in Mr Wynand Malan's National Democratic Movement of three former leading Progressive Federal Party members who participated in the Dakar talks.

In the survey, 80 percent of Afrikaners and 40 percent of English-speaking people disapproved of the talks.

The strongest disapproval was expressed by the over-50 age group, with more than 70 percent against the talks.

Disapproval was expressed by 56 percent of those polled in the Cape, as compared with 85 percent in the Free State.

The Dakar talks were viewed differently by supporters of the various political parties, with 91,2 percent of Herstigte National Party supporters opposed to the talks, but only 6,2 percent of PFP members.

Of those who declared their support for the Independent movement, 47,6 percent approved the Dakar talks and 35,7 percent disapproved.

Reasons given for disapproving the Dakar actions were:

- Negotiation with terrorist/murderers, 36 percent.
- Disapproval of extra-parliamentary actions, 13 percent.
- It serves no purpose and is a waste of time, 11 percent.
- The ANC is not interested in peace, 9 percent.
- It is propaganda for the ANC, 8 percent.

Of those who supported Dakar, 39 percent said negotiation led to cooperation, 17 percent saw it as an attempt to do something for peace, 17 percent said "somebody must act", 12 percent said it was necessary to know the enemy, and 5 percent said it kept communication channels open.

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**Lebowa's New Chief Rejects National Council**  
34000073a Johannesburg *BUSINESS DAY* in English  
22 Oct 87 p 5

[Text] Lebowa's new Chief Minister Mgoboya Ramodike yesterday appealed to other homeland leaders not to take part in the South African government's National Council (NC).

Ramodike, a campaigner against independence for the homelands, was yesterday voted successor to Chief Minister Cedric Phatudi, who died of cancer in a Pretoria hospital two weeks ago.

Ramodike has committed himself to the ideals of the former Chief Minister and emphasised he would never opt for independence, a Lebowa government spokesman said yesterday.

He also appealed to other homeland leaders not to take part in the proposed NC until all political leaders have been released and exiles brought home.

Ramodike was served in Phatudi's Cabinet as Economic Affairs Minister, was elected unanimously in the Lebowa Legislative Assembly yesterday morning, the spokesman said.

The only other nominee was former Chief Minister Maserumule Matlala, who was ousted by Phatudi in 1973. But Matlala withdrew before the electoral college could cast their vote. A spokesman said Matlala had been promised a post in Ramodike's Cabinet.

One of the former ministers axed by Ramodike in his new Cabinet is former Finance Minister Chief Chris Mathiba, who was earlier singled out as one of the three contenders for the chief minister's post.

Sapa reports the ministers serving in Ramodike's new Cabinet are M J Dube, Law and Order; Chief M M Marishane, Finance; S P Kwakwa, Health and Social Welfare; Chief Z T Seleka, Justice; Chief C P Hasha, Agriculture, Development and Environment; Chief H B Ramupudi, Education; L Mamabolo, Works; and L G Mathole, Home Affairs.

The ministers of water affairs and of transport are still to be announced.

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**Survey Reveals White Uncertainty About National Council**  
34000072c Johannesburg *THE CITIZEN* in English  
19 Oct 87 p 4

[Text] There is still a large measure of uncertainty among White voters, including National Party supporters, as to whether the Government will succeed in negotiations with Blacks to establish a National Council.

A survey conducted in August found that more than one-third of Whites are optimistic, but the majority have their doubts.

The question they were asked was whether they believed the Government would succeed in the foreseeable future in involving Blacks in the proposed National Council, or a similar body, in order to increase their contributions and their say in the government of the country.

The answers were: Yes 36,9 percent, No 28,0 percent, Uncertain 35,1 percent.

Among Afrikaners there was a 39,9 percent Yes vote, while 27 percent said No. Among English speaking voters 32,9 percent said Yes and 29,3 percent said No.

Only among NP voters did a majority believe the government would succeed, while all other voters believed the chances were slim. Pessimism was greatest among the younger voters.

Voters in Natal were more optimistic than those in the other provinces. The Yes vote in Natal was 46 percent, as against 34 percent in the Cape.

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**Poll: National Party Support Drops; Sharp Drop in PFP Backing**

*34000072b Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English  
19 Oct 87 p 4*

[Article by Brian Stuart]

[Text] A decline in support for the National Party and a more dramatic drop in Progressive Federal Party support is shown in a survey of White South African voters.

These parties lost support to the Conservative Party on the Right and to the Independent movement on the Left, according to a poll conducted by Market and Opinion Surveys for the Sunday newspaper, RAPPORT.

The survey showed that this year there have been significant swings in White political thinking—far wider than political shifts revealed in similar polls in recent years.

Support for the political parties in August, as compared with figures for February (in brackets), are as follows:

National Party 44,1 (49,4) percent

Conservative Party 22,1 (15,2) percent

Herstigte National Party 2,2 (2,8) percent

Progressive Federal Party 10,4 (19,4) percent

New Republic Party 1,4 (2,9) percent

Independents 11,9 (3,7) percent

Not voting 7,9 (6,6) percent

Compared with the findings in February, the August survey showed a 5,3 percent shift from the NP and a sharp movement of 9,0 percent away from the PFP.

The CP picked up 6,9 percent of White voters, while the most dramatic improvement was the 8,2 percent increase for the Independent movement, which has since split.

Indications are the CP reached its peak at the time of the May 6 White elections and has not grown since then.

The Independents, on the other hand, gained a fillip from the victory in Randburg and they came within 39 votes of victory in Helderberg.

However, the Independents have split inn the past fortnight, and there is no knowing how the continuing wrangle has affected their support.

The findings of the August poll are also significant when compared with the results in the May 6 House of Assembly elections.

On May 6, the NP polled 52,7 percent of the votes, CP 26,4 HNP 3,5, PFP 14,2, NRP 1,9 and Independents 1,3.

the Afrikaans speaking votes were divided as follows:

NP 58,6 percent, CP 32,0, HNP 4,6, PFP 4,3, NRP 0,2 and Independents 0,2.

English speaking votes were cast as follows: NP 43,1 percent, CP 5,1, HNP 0,6, PFP 35,3, NRP 5,1 and Independents 3,7.

This means the NP obtained almost twice as many Afrikaans votes as the CP, but also obtained more English votes than the PFP.

Among voters over the age of 50, the NP polled 59,6 percent, compared with 56,6 percent of voters under the age of 24.

Dr Andries Treurnicht's Conservative Party fared the worst in the younger voting group, with 20,7 percent of the under-24 vote.

Of the NP vote on May 6, 56,3 percent came from women.

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**Suzman: PFP Defections Inexplicable**

*34000072a Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English  
22 Oct 87 p 6*

[Text] Recent PFP "defections" were totally inexplicable, Helen Suzman (PFP Houghton) said last night.

She told a report-back meeting to constituents the PFP was down to the representation it had in 1977—16 MPs—as a result of the defection of Jan van Eck, Peter Gastrow, Pierre Cronje and President's Council member Pieter Schoeman.

Suzman said: "None of them claims to have any difference in principle, or basic policy, with the PFP and that to my mind is the only acceptable reason for deserting the party responsible for their holding public office.

"To defect in order to pursue 'process politics', whatever that may mean, is inexcusable."

The defectors had forgotten how much time, effort and money had been expended on them by the PFP. They had also forgotten the meaning of the word "loyalty".

Suzman said the May 6 election result was "extremely disappointing". The PFP had hoped to increase its representation from 26 seats to about 40. She said: "I may sound bitter, but perhaps you should remember I have been battling away since 1959, and to see the party which reached the heights that it did in 1981 being now on the other side of the hill, the down side, is to me heartbreaking."—Sapa

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## MILITARY

### Officers Receive Training in Spain

34480002 Bilbao DEIA in Spanish 19 Oct 87 p 21

[Text] According to an article published yesterday in DIARI DE BARCELONA, several South African officers have received training at Spain's general staff defense school, and have received diplomas and honors in the last few years. The last general staff diploma was issued last Thursday to an officer of the Pretoria regime in a ceremony presided over by the King; it was also attended by the defense minister Narcis Serra, according to the same article. The article in DIARI DE BARCELONA also reveals that "during the last 5 years, five South African army chiefs have been trained in Spain, and that, as a consequence, "the Spanish Army has placed itself outside the circle of condemnation and subsequent sanctions which the Spanish authorities recently imposed on the racist Pretoria regime.

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## ECONOMIC

### Survey of Companies: Sanctions 'To Get Worse'

34000075a Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 19 Oct 87 p 2

[Article by Gerald Reilly]

[Text] Pretoria—Sanctions and disinvestment pressures against SA would intensify next year, a survey of the top 100 industrial companies listed on the JSE has found.

The Unisa Bureau of Market Research survey says 68 percent of the corporate executives support that view, compared with 54 percent in the previous report.

About 53 percent believe the overall political situation will deteriorate next year, compared with 47 percent who took that view for 1987.

The majority—76 percent—also think labour unrest and strikes will increase in 1988 compared with 1987.

And 44 percent believe unemployment will also rise next year, while 47 percent do not believe companies will be hampered by shortages of business resources such as capital and raw materials.

On inflation, the executives forecast a lower rate next year—17,1 percent against 18,6 percent in 1986. They expect the real growth rate to be higher than in 1986—2,4 percent compared with 0,5 percent and they predict a growth rate of 2,1 percent for 1987.

About 52 percent also believe consumers will exert more pressure on the manufacturing industry, government and the media "to be more responsive to consumer problems". This is less than the 67 percent who felt that way in the last report.

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### Serious Discussion Between Labor, Business Shows Signs of Emerging

34000071c Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 26 Oct 87 p 7

[Article by Alan Fine]

[Text] It is still too soon to call it a debate. But there are signs of the beginning of serious discussion between labour and business on the macro-economic issues of the day, and the future.

Thus far communication between the two has been largely limited to sloganeering—demands for nationalisation, worker control and socialist structural change from the one side, and deregulation, privatisation and free markets from the other.

But certain events—notably last month's Toyota conference on unemployment, the Institute for Industrial Relations (IIR) gathering on wealth redistribution, as well as other more private gatherings—have provided some understanding of what at least some representatives of these powerful interest groups mean by these concepts.

Which is not to say there isn't a wide gulf between the respective schools of thought. And conditions for debate are far from perfect.

As Wits sociologist Duncan Innes wryly noted at the IIR conference, it seems rather pie-in-the skyish to be discussing the economy of a post-apartheid SA as the Conservative Party moves closer to the brink of power.

It is also, he commented, potentially a dangerous exercise, with institutions like the state of the emergency and the necklace available to deal with those who stray too far from the line.

Nevertheless, if SA is one day to be rescued from its political and economic crisis, someone, somewhere, sometime has to begin talk about these matters.

It was a statement of fact rather than a threat when Cosatu education secretary Alec Erwin told the IIR conference black worker attitudes towards capital are being, and will continue to be, shaped by stances taken by business on issues of redistribution and state repression of unions.

This, and the degree of confrontation in their relationship, would help determine the status of the private sector in a future SA.

On the redistribution of wealth, Erwin argued unions had to be involved in the political arena because it could not be achieved through normal wage bargaining.

What was required—as had occurred in western Europe through the efforts of labour and social democratic parties from the 30's to the 70's—was a reallocation of wealth to areas of "social consumption": namely education, health, housing, pensions and other social services.

In the boom years, wealth existed but was not used to build adequate social and physical infrastructures. Now 40 percent of the population lived in economic "wastelands" which were used to provide the cheap labour to build SA industry. Much of what little wealth existed after the economic ravages of the last few years went to the security services.

On nationalisation, Innes said the charter should be recognised as a 32-year-old document. Economic conditions had changed since 1955. If it could not be convincingly shown that nationalisation of "the heights of the economy" was the most appropriate method of redistributing wealth, given the economic realities of post-apartheid SA, the idea should be abandoned.

From a management perspective, the Perm's Bob Tucker argued that SA had a highly paternalistic form of capitalism which was anything but free enterprise. Educational, social and other disadvantages for the majority had created a high concentration of wealth among a minority.

On the micro-level, Wits Business School's Niké Binedell urged managements to take into account the outside environment and include soci-political issues in corporate strategy planning.

Obviously Tucker and Binedell represent viewpoints which other management groups would find too radical, while Erwin's and Innes's views would be repudiated by more hard-line sectors of the labour movement. So, while there are areas of implicit agreement between them, one should not read too much into this.

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**Study Reopens Job Creation Controversy**  
34000071b Johannesburg *BUSINESS DAY* in English  
26 Oct 87 p 7

[Article by Patrick Bulger]

[Text] A new study on SA's burgeoning informal sector has reopened a controversy about its role in alleviating unemployment.

Conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), the study concludes: "The informal sector is not a big provider of jobs to external people. Only 15.3 percent of respondents use other labour, while 47 percent use family labour, and 37 percent use no other labour. Less than a quarter of respondents pay workers for their work."

The findings have been criticised by protagonists of the informal sector who argue that, properly guided, it can, and will have to make, a huge contribution towards taking up the slack in formal sector job-creation.

The HSRC study was conducted among 59 small businessmen in Seshego, Pretoria, Kroonstad and Bloemfontein. The respondents were hawkers, shebeen owners, panelbeaters and builders.

The study concludes that a growing economy remains essential for job-creation as it creates the space within which small business could flourish.

It also warns against excessive deregulation, arguing that it could work against the interests of budding entrepreneurs.

Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC) development services manager Johan Naude said the report seemed to ignore the fact that "self-employment is job-creation".

He pointed out that the SBDC alone had created 150 000 job opportunities since its inception in 1982.



He said one could not adopt the simplistic attitude that informal sector growth would solve unemployment by itself. It had to be seen as just one method of providing jobs.

He said that since 1983 the SBDC had been responsible for the creation of 3 867 businesses which had obtained capital in terms of the mini-loan programme.

He said the SBDC would like to study the report in detail before commenting further.

Urban Foundation enterprise development manager Keith Foster said the informal sector could be divided between what he called the "survivors" and the "entrepreneurs".

"The survivors—who had really created their own dole systems—were structurally unemployed and survive through activities such as hawking. Given an option, they would take alternative employment," he said.

Foster agreed over-hasty deregulation could harm the small business base that had been built and argued for a "twilight period" in which frail black business could be given a chance to adapt to the prospect of open competition.

Free Market Foundation administrative director Eustace Davie said the survey ignored that employing oneself and one's family was an important part of job-creation.

He said respondents would naturally be hesitant to answer detailed questions about their business which tended to be illegal.

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#### **Rand Mines Expansion Program To Create 20,000 Jobs**

34000070b Johannesburg THE STAR (Business)  
in English 23 Oct 87 p 17

[Text] The Rand Mines Group is engaged in a R2 billion expansion programme that will create over 20 000 new jobs in a climate of high unemployment in South Africa, Warren Clewlow, chief executive of Barlow Rand, has said.

Speaking at the official opening of the new R250 million number 4 shaft complex at the Harmony Gold Mine—one of several new mining developments being tackled by Rand Mines—Mr Clewlow said that, apart from Harmony number 4 shaft complex, the projects under-way in the Rand Mines Group included:

—The new Barplats Platinum Mine—to be developed near Steelpoort, Transvaal, at a cost of R500 million;

—The new Barbrook Gold Mine near Barberton—a R100 million development;

—The Escom-tied Khutala and Majuba underground coal mines—which are costing a total of R800 million to establish;

—The R300 million Far East project that will give the ERPM gold mine a 50-year extension; and

The R60 million City Deep sand and slime retreatment plant that Barlow Rand chairman Mike Rosholt will officially open next week.—Sapa

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#### **Platinum Mining Firm Formed**

34000038a Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English  
7 Oct 87 p 11

[Article by Adam Payne]

[Text] A new company—Barplats Investments—has been formed to hold the joint platinum interests in Rhodium Reefs of Rand Mines and Vansa. Barplats Investments' first moves will be to:—Seek a listing on the JSE towards the end of October;—Raise R360m, by a rights offer, to help finance the new venture which will cost R530m in 1987 money. Barplats will own the entire issued share capital of Rhodium Reefs, the company which is to establish the platinum mine at Kennedy's Vale near Steelpoort, on ground which is underlain by the platinum-bearing Merensky and UG2 reefs. In terms of the agreement implemented earlier this year when Rand Mines acquired 42 percent of Vansa, Rand Mines will provide R52,5m of the initial funding of the platinum venture. To raise the R360m, Barplats will make a rights offer of 1,162-million linked units to Rand Mines and Vansa. Each of these units will comprise:—Ten shares of 1c each at R15 a share, and;—Eight unsecured compulsorily convertible debentures of R20 each at par, bearing interest at 8 percent. The debentures will be automatically covered into Barplats shares on December 31, 1992, on a one-for-one basis. Rand Mines will subscribe for 663 486 of its entitlement of 887 700 linked units (derived directly and also through its 42 percent holding in Vansa) at a cost of R205,7m. The remaining 224 214 linked units will be offered to Rand Mines' shareholders on a basis of two linked units for every 100 Rand Mines shares held. Vansa will follow 65 of its 464 800 entitlement, leaving 464 735 linked units which will be renounced in favour of Vansa shareholders as well as holders in Vansa options and Vansa convertible prefs. The basis of the offer will be in the ratio of one linked unit for every 100 Vansa securities held. After the offer, 17,11 percent of Barplats will be held by the public, 58,84 percent by Rand Mines and 24,05 percent by Vansa. However, taking Rand Mines' 42 percent holding in Vansa into account, Rand Mines' effective interest in Barplats will be 68,94 percent. The mine will be established on the UG2 reef at an initial milling capacity of 180 000 tons a month, increasing to 270 000

tons at a later stage. Construction will start immediately, while production will begin in 1992. Rand Mines will manage the mine and market the platinum group metals it produces.

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**Impala Platinum To Establish New Mine**  
34000070a Johannesburg *THE STAR (Business)*  
in English 23 Oct 87 p 17

[Article by Teigue Payne]

[Text] Impala Platinum Holdings is to establish a new mine at Marikana, 30km east of Rustenburg, at a cost of R300 million financed by a rights issue.

The Karee mine will be wedged between the Rustenburg section of Rustenburg Platinum Mines and Western Platinum's lease area. It will mine both Merensky and UG2 reefs. Reserves so far have been calculated at 130 million tons, with an in situ grade of 5.5g/t of combined platinum group metals on Merensky and 180 million tons at an average 5.3g/t on the UG2.

The grades are uncorrected, however, and the reality could be 10 percent higher, according to Mr Don Ireland, managing director of Impala. Recovery grades in prospect are, says Mr Ireland, slightly higher than Impala's existing grades.

The UG2 reef outcrops on the 600ha property's southern boundary, and the Merensky outcrops slightly north of it. Both reefs dip northwards and reach 1 450 metres (Merensky) and 1 600 metres (UG2) at their deepest.

Since Merensky grades are highest in the central area, the first shaft will be sunk there, but four shallow winzes will be sunk on the UG2 outcrop to bring the mine on stream as soon as possible. Later, an incline shaft will be sunk in the central area to mine UG2 reef.

Construction will begin in early 1988. The first metal will be produced early in 1990, building up to an initial planned level of 100 000 ounces of platinum a year by 1991. Smelting will be at Impala's smelter in Bophuthatswana and refining at its refinery in Springs.

Total output is planned to increase to 300 000 ounces a year by the year 2000, although it could be speeded up, depending on the market. The initial goal is to make up for a decline in production from Impala's operation in Bophuthatswana and increase Impala's production marginally.

Impala is opening the mine after the recent announcements of seven other new platinum projects, creating fear of oversupply in the market in the medium term.

Mr Ireland says if all projects announced (except the Severin Steelport project, which was announced too recently for inclusion) produce as planned, production of platinum in Southern Africa will rise from 2.2 million a year currently to 3.2 million in 1994.

Impala is being cautious about its expansion because of the over-supply possibility. However, Mr Ireland says that with its established position, Impala is confident of being competitive. Working costs, which Impala will not reveal, will be slightly lower at Karee than at its existing Bophuthatswana operation.

Mr Ireland says Impala is banking on an eight percent real rate of return on the project. The project will not benefit from Impala's tax shelter as the existing Impala operation is in Bophuthatswana and the Karee mine is wholly within South Africa.

Mr Ireland says the rights offer will not materially affect Impala's dividends for the current financial year—although this will entail some reduction of cover—and Impala's 1987 dividend of 160c should be maintained.

9738

**Black Coal Miners Divided on Sanctions**  
34000038b Johannesburg *BUSINESS DAY* in English  
9 Oct 87 p 8

[Article by Theo Rawana]

[Text] Black coal miners, faced with the prospect of job losses as a result of the drop in SA coal exports, were divided on sanctions against the industry when I spoke to some of them this week.

SA coal producers have seen exports to the EEC slump by almost 37 percent in the first quarter of this year as sanctions began to bite.

Interviews with workers at Douglas Colliery, Greenside, and Duvha Open Cast Mine showed the miners were aware of the possibility of some mines closing down because of the drop in coal exports.

But Johnny Stona, a supervisor in the drag-line department at Duvha Open Cast Mine—where workers had gone on strike for 12 days during the recent labour unrest—said rejecting sanctions would be rejecting freedom.

"Government holds the key to the problem of sanctions. If they release their grip on the black man, sanctions will go," he said.

Stona, who has worked on the mine for six years, said accumulating experience on a mine and getting no fitting financial returns was what made people bitter.

His view on sanctions was echoed by a fitter's assistant, who refused to give his name. "The mines deserve whatever comes their way if they do not want to pay a living wage."

He said it made no difference whether people worked or not. He said he was bitter at a neighbouring steel company which, he said, was operating on completely new staff after a strike.

Petros Nkambule, a recreation officer at Douglas Colliery, was horrified at the prospect of retrenchments that would follow, bringing in their wake hunger and a rise in crime.

"It's all very well to say sanctions should come, but what of the thousands who would not get alternative jobs in the event of mine closures? Surely there are ways of fighting for freedom other than calling for sanctions?" asked Nkambule, who has worked on the mine for more than nine years.

Blacks, not SA, would suffer in the event of a blanket ban on coal exports and closure of mines, said Alfred Shongwe, a loss control officer at Greenside Colliery.

"We have blacks from TBVC states who work here to feed, clothe and—more importantly—educate their children. Loss of jobs would mean no education for those children. And what would we be left with? A lot of illiterate leaders who would lead Southern Africa into further chaos," said Shongwe.

9738

**Fewer Exporters Using Maputo Port**  
34000075c Johannesburg *BUSINESS DAY* in English  
21 Oct 87 p 15

[Article by Dianna Games]

[Text] Security problems and lack of facilities at Maputo harbour have led to a decline in its use by exporters in the Nelspruit area—the nearest centre in SA to the port.

But, predicts Huffy Potts, past president of the Nelspruit Chamber of Commerce, it is likely this will change when the major revamp of the port, now under way, is complete.

#### **Problems**

Potts said problems included:

—Goods not being loaded onto ships due to the breakdown of fork-lifts which were not repaired because of spare shortages or lack of skilled manpower;

—The fact that several ships no longer called at that port;

—The blowing up of the railway line by rebels.

He said even if those incidents did not happen often, experiencing problems of that nature once or twice was frequent enough to prejudice exporters.

Exporters with perishable goods and those with shorter due dates could not afford delays and thus tended to go for the more reliable SA ports despite the considerably higher cost involved.

Potts said Maputo would have to buy back much of its market unless there were full guarantees for exporters on their goods.

It has been predicted the three-phase revamp of Maputo harbour, costing millions of rands, will increase the harbour's income from R23m to R168m.

9738

**Free Trade Zone Opened Near Johannesburg**  
34000075b Johannesburg *THE CITIZEN* in English  
21 Oct 87 p 18

[Text] The World Trade Centre, opened yesterday by the WTC Association president, Mr Richard Anderson from Washington, will link South African businessmen with nearly 1.5 million buyers and sellers from all over the world.

Mr Anderson said that the WTCA's satellite-linked data network had terminals at 130 member centres around the globe. These transmitted information on goods and market opportunities, and shared information about trade-related matters.

The centre, near Jan Smuts Airport, enjoys special status as a "free trade zone", and visiting international buyers and executives need minimal visa formalities.

The centre brings together buyers and sellers, manufacturers and retailers, importers and exporters along with associated trading services such as shipping and clearing agents, insurance and legal advisors, all under one roof.

Central to the complex is the R30 million Trade and Merchandise Mart which offers an international "shop window" to all categories of commerce and industry from primary to tertiary.

Apart from trade facilities the World Trade Centre also offers educational and promotional services to boost local and foreign trade.

The World Trade Centre Association, of which the South African WTC is a member, stands for apolitical, unrestricted free trade and has led international trade for the last 17 years. It has 130 member nations and is represented in 52 countries.



The future development of the centre will include a major international hotel, a commodities exchange, offices for brokers, clearing agents and business houses, and conference and educational facilities.

Mnr Neels Swart, the centre's executive chairman, said the centre would be a magnet for the PWV area.

9738

**Report Studies Black Migrant Wages, Expenditures**

34000071a Johannesburg *BUSINESS DAY* in English  
27 Oct 87 p 12

[Text] Pretoria—SA's 1.2-million black migrant labourers, classified as "single households", earned R9 407m in 1985.

According to details of a research report published in Pretoria yesterday by Unisa's Bureau of Market Research, their cash expenditure in '85 amounted to R3 926m.

Although these single households represented only 29 percent of all blacks in SA's metropolitan areas, their income made up 59 percent of the total income, and their cash expenditure 54 percent of the total spent by blacks in these areas.

"Black single households, most of whom are migrant labourers, are financially independent."

Hostel residents made up 62 percent of the category, domestic servants and gardeners living on white premises, 20 percent, people living or lodging with other blacks, 12 percent, and those who lived on business and government premises the remaining 6 percent.

The BMR said about 75 percent of these people were men, one-third of them 30 to 39 years old.

Generally speaking, the level of education was "not very high".

The average annual income of black single households in the PWV areas in 1985 was R4 715, while it was put at R4 368 in other metropolitan areas.

Hostel residents had the highest average income of R5 226, as opposed to domestic servants and gardeners, who earned R2 474 annually.

Of the latter category, 41 percent of income represented payment in kind, being mainly free accommodation, food and working clothes.

"In 1985 mining was the sector of employment that paid the highest salaries to black male single households (R6 296), followed by manufacturing (R5 669)."

The BMR noted black single households in metropolitan areas made a major contribution to the income of their dependents living elsewhere.

"In 1985 they sent an estimated R489m in cash to their dependants and saved a further R191m, most of which was presumably also taken home to their families."

Much of the R412-million they spent on furniture and household equipment probably included expenditure on these items sent to their families.

Other main expenditure items included food (R1 362m), clothing and footwear (R429m), transport (R357m), housing (R241m), insurance and funds (R229m) and alcoholic beverages (R229m).

"Black hostel residents spent relatively the most on alcoholic beverages and cigarettes, while those living with other blacks spent relatively the most on housing, personal care and recreation, entertainment and sport.

"Domestic servants and gardeners spent relatively the most on education, probably on their children's education in particular, while those living on business and government premises spent relatively the most on holidays."—Sapa

9738

**Qwa Qwa Launches Massive Housing Program**

34000070c Johannesburg *BUSINESS DAY* in English  
20 Oct 87 p 15

[Article by Sophie Tema]

[Text] The Qwa Qwa Development Corporation's housing division has decided to spend more than R1m before the end of its current financial year to ease the homeland's critical housing shortage.

In Tshiame 100 houses will be built at a cost of R1.3m starting from the beginning of November.

Tshiame Housing Project will build the first 50 houses, and an additional 50 will be built by the Department of Development Aid.

QDC public relations officer Zandi Sikwebu said the houses would have from two to four rooms. They would be wired and tubbed in readiness for electricity and would have inside toilets and bathrooms.

Sikwebu said: "In addition a project for the building of 10 elite houses is expected to start at the beginning of next year where residents will be allowed to buy or rent their houses. The purchase price and rent will be determined by the value of the house after completion towards the middle of next year.



"The houses will consist of three bedrooms, a dining-room, lounge, bathroom, inside toilet, kitchen, garage and patio, and will be electrified. The maintenance of bought houses will be the responsibility of the buyer from the moment the agreement of sale is completed, while the QDC will be responsible for the maintenance of rented houses only."

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## SOCIAL

### **Cosatu's Political Stance on Sanctions, Disinvestment Analyzed**

34000077b Braamfontein *FRONTLINE* in English  
Aug/Sep 87 pp 14-16

[Article by FINANCIAL MAIL Labour Editor Amar-nath Singh]

[Text] The strategy employed to build up the nonracial trade union movement less than a decade ago has been joined, but not quite supplanted, by a political thrust under the stewardship of Cosatu (the Congress of SA Trade Unions).

It of course seeks nothing less than the removal of the present regime—in concert with, and subordinate to, the broader national movements. Hence a separate workers' party or a distinctly socialist one is not on Cosatu's agenda in the "first stage," despite the constant refrain of "s-o-c-i-a-l-i-s-m" the unions sang as they filed beneath colourful banners into the hall for their second congress at Wits last month.

This overtly political cause, expressed in the union federation's formal adoption of the Freedom Charter as its guiding light, has caused a certain amount of fuss.

But as the federation explains it: "Cosatu's political stance is not a sudden spurt of militancy or a dramatic change in direction for the progressive trade union movement—it grows out of struggles that went before, and from the growing militancy of workers in the factories and the townships." It believes it is "our right to address the political demands of our members." As general secretary Jay Naidoo says: "Non-political unions are not only undesirable in SA, they're impossible." And who can gain-say that view so long as blacks haven't proper political channels to take up those demands, and so long as they feel oppressed as a class? It should be remembered that more than 750 Cosatu members and officials have been detained under the emergency.

Consequently, Cosatu has linked up with "progressive democratic organisations" to mount campaigns for ending the emergency, releasing political prisoners, unbanning of banned organisations, and so on. Specifically worker issues and largely union-organised campaigns

tend of course to be more effective, with May Day and June 16 becoming focal points for such demands. Its high political profile was a feature of Cosatu's launch back in December 1985.

Ironically, opting for the charter puts Cosatu to the right, in socialist terms, of those who embrace a more overtly socialist or workers' charter—despite the appearance of radicalism implied in sharing the same political blueprint as the ANC.

Union militancy in the pursuit of workplace demands is a shade different. Some industrial relations experts and adherents of the Fosatu doctrine (the less "political" union approach which dominated Cosatu's predecessor), question the strategy and tactics in certain disputes, and feel the unions ought to be more open to compromise for incremental gains. It could be argued that Sats dispute might have been more astutely handled, with the real prospect of securing strong union entry to the huge public sector employers, and so building the movement.

Cosatu on the other hand feels its shop-floor struggles (Pick 'n Pay, OK, mine and railway disputes) "demonstrates the ever rising confidence and power of workers..."

The high profile strikes like the NUM v the mining industry, have at least the feel of tackling the system. Yet it is hard to see the kinds of big labour disputes of recent years being rendered illegal for "political" reasons by any legislation of the kind rumoured to be in the pipeline. They are in the main legal by definition as they comply with the Labour Relations Act.

Yet Cosatu's "Living Wage Campaign" (launched in March), which translates into a campaign for a redistribution of wealth led by industrial unions, gives the unions "a concrete issue to link up with our democratic allies among the youth, civic and other progressive organisations," according to Jay Naidoo.

On the political front, the most thorny issue centres on Cosatu's full support for sanctions and disinvestment, which leaves many askance and saying, but surely this is cutting off your nose to spite your face.

Nevermind that the call for "comprehensive mandatory" sanctions seems rather more honoured in Cosatu rhetoric than action, or that their effective implementation, and the retrenchments they could bring, present the unions with an awesome dilemma. The fact is that Cosatu's approach is part of the changed political climate of SA in the Eighties, and reflects the sense of impatience, if not impotence, many blacks feel in the face of a status quo that is perceived to be incapable of changing to the extent Cosatu, and probably most blacks, would like.

It's like Archbishop Desmond Tutu, taking the case for sanctions in the absence of other leverage, throwing up his hands and asking: "If not this, then what?" And it's like Robert Mugabe, who surely needs no lesson in the extent of Zimbabwe's transport and economic dependency on SA, nevertheless feeling he must sever those links, and so contribute to apartheid's downfall.

Cosatu's education officer Alec Erwin explains: "It cannot be denied that economic sanctions cause unemployment, but it is difficult to accurately estimate how much." What we do know, however, he adds, "is that apartheid capitalism is responsible for millions being unemployed, with thousands more losing their jobs every day... If sanctions could remove this regime, then we could start working towards economic restructuring and recovery."

Utopian or not, that, in a nutshell, explains why Cosatu steadfastly supports the stick of sanctions—even to the point, it would seem, of wanting to remove the very plants which provide the basis of union existence and power.

While stressing that "sanctions cannot help people," Erwin points out that their purpose is to pressure the government into changing. "The Nationalist government is the obstacle which has to be removed before people can be effectively assisted," he says.

To Erwin and by extension Cosatu, those who oppose sanctions are often the same ones who call for increased productivity as an answer to SA's problems. But what is ignored, he contends, is that this "will in all probability result in mechanisation, retrenchment, and therefore increased unemployment and suffering." The reason why sanctions are unacceptable, he maintains, is because they threaten profits.

Many still of course take issue with the assumption that mechanisation simply gobbles up jobs for all time, even though the mining industry has been effecting structural changes reducing manpower levels. Mechanisation also becomes more attractive as labour costs rise. But can any sensible debate on the very complex subject of productivity take place in a society where the adversaries start with radically different premises?

Still on sanctions, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), Cosatu's biggest affiliate, resolved at its conference in April to "ensure that whenever sanctions pressures take effect the wealth created by workers remains the property of the people of SA for the benefit of all. "To many, this may be little more than words, eliding practical questions of how, or whether, it can be achieved in reality.

In the case of the NUM, the obvious next question is what happens when, for example, the coal they produce is effectively blocked on world markets, causing colliery workers to be laid off. In an interview after the NUM

Congress, general secretary Cyril Ramaphosa admits "it is a very difficult situation to deal with. If workers are retrenched, what do you do? We address it by saying that our members should be conscientised as to what the full consequences of sanctions are going to be."

Ramaphosa continued: "We do not have a Coca Cola or IBM type situation where they pull out and leave their assets in the country. When a customer refuses to buy our coal—it is a more tricky situation and the best we can do is to make our members aware of the situation. The NUM remains supportive of the sanctions campaign."

Awareness or conscientisation are of course no substitute for lost bread. So either the membership are prepared to sacrifice jobs for the bigger cause (which many outsiders find hard to believe), or union leaders are leading their members up the garden path (which, presumably, would have provoked a backlash by now).

When The Cosatu executive was asked at the end of their second national congress how workers would survive if foreign companies all shut shop and left, Cosatu information officer, Frank Meintjies turned the question round like this: "Perhaps the question should be, if the factories closed down, would the government be able to survive?"

But even if the answer were "yes, it probably could survive," Cosatu are unlikely to desist since disruption of the SA economy wouldn't be viewed by it in quite the same light as those with a relatively bigger stake, who either wish to "preserve the baby" while ditching the apartheid bathwater, or those who essentially want the system to continue with a few adjustments to its more iniquitous aspects.

Erwin goes further: "Sanctions imposed here and there without careful thought will not translate into an effective form of pressure," he maintains, since investments are either being held in trust or sold to Anglo.

Against this backdrop, it is no surprise that Cosatu shuns the latest attempt to give black workers a stake in the economy through equity participation. This evidently smacks too much of class collaboration in a system they want scrapped.

For all the dismay this apparent redirection away from primarily factory-floor issues has evoked—amongst management and not least (but for different reasons) the "workerists" associated with the Fosatu mentality of a few years ago—the joining of the political struggle along with shop-floor demand now carries the day. In a sense Cosatu picked up the torch when other organisations like the myriad civics and the UDF were rendered almost inactive by the state of emergency.

**Cosatu Faces Difficulties in Mobilizing Farm, Domestic Labor**

34000076b Johannesburg *FINANCIAL MAIL*  
in English 23 Oct 87 pp 86-87

[Text] How many employers pay their domestic workers R200 or more a month? This (among other things) is the minimum wage demand by the SA Domestic Workers' Union (Sadwu). Along with farm workers, it is still seeking government recognition.

But although backed by the powerful Congress of SA Trade Unions (Cosatu), chances of domestic and farm workers getting government recognition, and therefore bargaining power, look slim for now.

A National Manpower Commission inquiry into the conditions of farm and domestic workers was launched in May 1982; the results have still not been published. Speculation has it that the report recommends that farm and domestic workers have the right to form trade unions. And it's generally believed that government is acting under pressure from the conservative agricultural sector in delaying publication of the report.

Manpower Director General Piet van der Merwe tells the FM his department is still negotiating the proposals with the agricultural union, but he won't elaborate. He explains the delay by saying that the agricultural sector is "very large and complex". A spokesman for the agricultural union says negotiations could still take months.

Meanwhile, Sadwu claims membership of about 50 000. But Cosatu spokesman Frank Meintjies says there are about 9 500 paid-up and between 15 000 and 20 000 signed-up members. He explains it is difficult to canvass members, as it has to be done by means of pamphlets.

And so mobilising domestic and farm workers remains Cosatu's main concern. The workers are scattered throughout the country, and not as accessible as in organised industry. And although some farm workers (Cosatu claims "thousands") do belong to trade unions, they have no organised union.

Food and Allied Workers' Union General Secretary Jan Theron says a close relationship between Fawu and farm workers (that is, between farm workers and the processing factories where Cosatu has strong support) is a prerequisite for a successful farm workers' trade union. High up on the list of such a union would be job security, health issues and different local demands, says Theron.

Sadwu calls for a minimum wage of R200 a month; access to the Unemployment Insurance Fund; eight working hours a day, five days a week; maternity leave; annual leave with full payment; sick leave; overtime pay at R2,50 an hour; pension fund; and decent accommodation.

The question remains whether farm and domestic workers are not running the risk of pricing themselves out of the market. They are in most cases not skilled and are easily substituted, either by machines or the unemployed, and are—especially in the case of domestic workers—not an absolute necessity.

Sadwu president Violet Motlasedi, on her part, says she doesn't care about the possibility of increased unemployment "because we've been unemployed before. As long as the workers are united." If employers cannot pay, they must reduce the working hours, she says.

Strike action is also a problem—even if domestic and farm workers' unions were to be recognised. The workers have difficulty leaving their premises, as most of them live in the homes or on the grounds of their employers. So, until a strategy to mobilise the workers is developed, Sadwu's main function will be to educate workers on their rights and on how to approach their employers. Meanwhile, Cosatu hopes to organise the workers through street and area committees.

Whatever the practicality of domestic and farm workers' unions, the fact remains that there is a need for some protection from exploitation. Some argue they should be incorporated into the Labour Relations Act, which allows collective bargaining; the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, which provides minimum working conditions; and the Machinery and Occupational Safety Act.

Anyway, as Wiehahn suggested years ago, prohibiting trade unions will not abolish the workers' urge to form them, but will only force them to go underground.

9738

**Two Cosatu Unions Merge**

34000069c Johannesburg *SOWETAN* in English  
20 Oct 87 p 4

[Text] Two Cosatu affiliates merged at the weekend to form the Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers' Union (PPWAWU), a statement said.

The unions are the Paper, Wood and Allied Workers' Union (PWAWU) and the National Union of Printing Workers' (NUPAWO).

PPWAWU has been launched with a paid-up membership of 24 260.

The statement said "the merger is in line with the Cosatu policy of one industry, one union."

Resolutions adopted at the congress included:

—"A total rejection of proposed changes to labour laws and a commitment to fight them by all means possible.



—"Full support for the Freedom Charter and its adoption as the basic minimum demands of the oppressed and exploited in South Africa."—Sapa.

9738

### **CWIU Reaches Major Agreement With Sasol**

34000077c Johannesburg *THE NEW NATION*  
in English 1-7 Oct 87 p 15

[Text] In another major move towards greater worker participation in the workplace, the chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU) last week finalised a provident fund agreement in the mining industry.

The agreement with Sasol affects about 10 000 coalminers.

Trade unions, mainly those from the Cosatu stable, have in recent years identified numerous shortfalls in the existing pension fund schemes over which workers have little or no control.

The CWIU's general secretary, Rod Crompton, said provident funds were negotiated between workers and management. For this reason they had greater credibility than pensions funds, which were unilaterally introduced by management.

Provident funds also allow for greater worker control. In the case of the Sasol provident fund, for example, workers and bosses enjoy equal representation on the fund.

One of the first provident fund agreements was signed by the Sweet, Food and Allied Workers Union (SFAWU) with the huge sugar company, CG Smith.

SFAWU merged with the Food and Canning Workers Union into the Food and Allied workers Union (Fawu), whose members at Stellenbosch Farmers Winery (SFW) went on strike recently demanding immediate negotiations to introduce a provident fund.

Identifying some of the problems with the existing pension fund, Fawu branch organiser Rene Roux lists insufficient benefits at retirement, small monthly payments instead of lump sum payments and the lack of consultation over the operation of the fund, investment of contributions and the benefits paid.

Workers at SFW first raised their dissatisfaction with the pension fund in February this year when they demanded the refund of all their pension fund contributions.

### **Provident Fund Agreements**

Numerous provident fund agreements have been established in recent years in all major sectors.

Fawu alone has signed at least seven agreements at some of the biggest companies, including Tiger Milling, Premier, Sasko, BB Bread, CG Smith Hulett's and Tongaat.

The National Union of Metalworkers of SA (Numsa) also finalised an agreement with Metal Box recently in terms of which a shop steward was elected chairman of the fund.

The emphasis in all cases has been greater worker control over how their contributions will be used for their benefit and where it will be invested.

In the case of pension funds, workers are paid interest rates of between two and four percent, although investment yield up to 20 percent and more. In the case of pension funds, workers forfeit the employer's contribution if they withdraw from the fund before retirement.

Provident funds have addressed this problem and workers covered by a provident fund are entitled to both the employers' and their own contributions plus all the interest earned.

With Cosatu membership concentrated among blue-collar workers, the funds have placed emphasis on the lower-paid sector of the workforce.

This is where the problems inherent in pension fund schemes are the most serious.

Workers in this sector are, for example, most prone to dismissal and therefore run the risk of forfeiting benefits that they have accumulated over many years.

9738

### **Draft Bill Aims at Greater Gun Control**

34000074c Johannesburg *BUSINESS DAY* in English  
27 Oct 87 p 12

[Text] Increasing gun thefts—more than 10 000 were stolen or lost over the last year—has resulted in a tough new draft law which is aimed at greater control over the use of firearms.

Many of the stolen or lost firearms have been used in crime and faction-fighting.

In terms of the new law, which has been published for comment, owners will have to prove they were not responsible for weapons being lost or stolen.

Another provision of the draft bill, which is expected to be introduced in Parliament next year, lays down that if people licensed to possess arms are not carrying the weapons on them, or are not in direct control of them, they will be obliged to lock them up in strong-rooms of safes.



Over the past year, more than 10 000 weapons have been lost or stolen.

The proposed amendment Bill to the Arms and Ammunition Act will shift the burden of proof in the case of lost or stolen firearms on the person licensed to possess the weapon.

9738

**AWB Attempting To Take Over Neighborhood Watch Programs**

34000068b Johannesburg *THE CITIZEN in English*  
20 Oct 87 p 12

[Text] The Afrikaner-Weerstandsbeweging—denied the right to serve on the Police Reserve—is mounting what amounts to a bid to hijack the mushrooming neighbourhood watches.

At the same time members and branches of the AWB, in areas where no watch has so far been set up, are being instructed by their executive from Pretoria to establish such organisations.

The national leader of the AWB, Mr Eugene Terre'Blanche, confirmed in Pretoria yesterday that he was instructing the AWB's members to become more active in the neighbourhood watches.

This, he said, was because the government had shown it no longer had full control of law and order, through its security forces.

AWB involvement in the neighbourhood watches, he said, was imperative to ensure proper law enforcement.

The police were now more involved in keeping the different Blacks from "getting stuck into each other"—and meanwhile people were being stabbed in the streets because of inadequate law enforcement.

He said the urban security situation, particularly, was being aggravated by the abolition of the influx laws.

The result was Blacks were streaming to the cities, and the police no longer had the power to act properly.

He said the time was undoubtedly ripe for the institution of a curfew system.

The country was being told there were not enough policemen. He said: "And I'll tell you why they are too few."

"Firstly, they are underpaid. Secondly, the reservists are also too few. Simply because the bearers of the power and force of resistance are the AWB, we are not allowed to serve as reservists."

Mr Terre'Blanche said the Minister of Law and Order, Mr Vlok had urged the creation of neighbourhood watches. Where would he find them if not in the ranks of this core of resistance, the AWB?

He said he was telling AWB members: "In God's name, join the neighbourhood watches. Prepare and steel yourselves—this government is unable to stem the revolution."

"We shall have to do it ourselves. History demands it of us."

9738

**Minister Warns of Serious Problems Due to High Birthrate**

34000074b Johannesburg *THE CITIZEN in English*  
27 Oct 87 p 13

[Text] The Minister of Health and Population Development, Dr Willie van Niekerk, warned yesterday that South Africa was heading for serious problems if the high birth rate was not curbed.

Formally opening the biennial congress of the Institute of Public Health in Pretoria, Dr Van Niekerk said that if the fertility rate continued at its present rate, the country would have its optimal estimated population by the year 2020. This was a figure of 80 million people—a figure in fact targeted for the end of next century.

Optimal population, he said, was the maximum the country's resources could sustain and at the same time improve the nation's lifestyle.

Dr Van Niekerk said that the country's population was increasing at an average rate of 2,3 percent a year. If this rate continued, the present population of 28 million would increase to 47 million by the year 2000, to more or less 80 million by 2020—and to 128 million by the year 2040.

The country had to maintain a growth rate of 5 percent annually to be able to provide work for the 1 000 people a day who would be entering the labour market.

If a growth rate of 3 percent were maintained, only half these people would have jobs.

Dr Van Niekerk said that from a demographic point of view, the country would have to maintain stable growth by the year 2010 to 2015, to maintain the target of 80 million by the end of the next century.

This meant that the country's total fertility rate would have to decrease to an average of 2,1 children per woman before the year 2010.

"In view of these facts, it would have been irresponsible of us not to take measures to maintain the balance between our resources and our population," he said.

That measure had been taken with the introduction of the population development programme, which was launched in March, 1984.

The main aim of the programme, he said, was to improve the quality of life of all South Africa's citizens.

Research and experience had shown that with the improvement in the quality of life, there was an accompanying decrease in the fertility rate.

9738

### **Blacks Give Opinion of Varying Perceptions of 'Freedom'**

34000076a Braamfontein *FRONTLINE* in English  
Aug/Sep 87 pp 17-18

[Article by Nomavenda Mathiane]

[Text] Saturday morning in the township. Suddenly the car ahead comes to a grinding stop. You slam on your brakes, and so does the person behind you. There is no movement. Tempers begin to flare. Motorists start hooting. On investigation, you discover that two taxi drivers traveling in opposite directions have decided to hold a conversation right in the middle of the road.

On such occasions, powerless and disgruntled motorists and taxi-passengers throw their hands in the air and utter "What can we do, these chaps are the law into themselves." It is at such incidents that one hears the remark: "So that is the freedom that black people are fighting for! The freedom to stop anywhere, and inconvenience anyone."

At the Zimbabwe independence celebrations, a group of South Africans were walking back to our various hotels from the stadium. Our hearts were heavy and we were all asking ourselves the obvious question: when was it going to be our turn? Then we came across a group of Zimbabweans seated on the pavement drinking "Shibuku". They offered us some but we declined. One of them sauntered to us, and with a drunken slur said: "we have long been liberated, freedom we have just had."

That statement hit me hard. I realised for the first time that freedom and liberation were two concepts whose meanings I barely understood. How much we were being bombarded with the two words and how everybody took them for granted. Lately, I tried to find what they mean.

At a party I spoke to a woman who had been entertaining us about her problems with her colleagues, and how her blackness stopped her from being free and equal with

them. She was on the ball and we were spellbound with her anecdotes. But then I asked her "What is your perception of freedom? At what stage in your life will you say you are free?"

One would have thought I had said something terribly rude. She paused for a long time and when she spoke she said: "Freedom, what is freedom? I don't know." She tried to smile while groping for an answer, looking around at her friends for reassurance. That simple question messed up the laughter and the joking. People wanted to joke about how problems are because of our lack of finding freedom. What if we should acquire our freedom and then still have problems? That is not something to be thought of.

At a shebeen I asked guys what they understood about freedom. "The right for us to move into white areas and for poor whites to move into black areas" was one reply which got the approval of most.

Probing on the mechanics of arriving at the situation, I was told that perhaps not many blacks were financially qualified to go to white areas, but that many whites were sheltered by the privileges accrued by being white.

"As a whitey, you can get a loan to buy a house, a farm or start a business. The type of job you do puts you immediately in a good earning bracket and from there a number of privileges roll in. Whereas if you are black, before you can qualify for a housing loan you have to meet certain obligations."

"There are many negating issues. So the government that we will put into power will have to cater for our needs as voters or the struggle will continue" said one of the men.

Another said: "In the South African situation it means the whites relinquishing power to blacks." Another: "that we can do whatever work we are qualified for and live wherever we want to, like the whites."

The biggest argument was about whether poor whites should be brought to live in black areas. Some said there was no way whites could want to live in Soweto. Whether under Mandela or Mlambo ghettos will always be there for poor blacks, not for whites. Some pointed out that in Africa there were no poor areas where one could find poor blacks living door to door with whites. A classical example was Zimbabwe where only blacks have moved up and not the other way round. "Have you heard of a single white who now lives in Rufaro township? They have kept to their lifestyles even if the standards may have dropped. Do you envisage a time when there will be whites who will live on pap and spinach? Even the liberals who are always telling of their love and empathy for blacks do not want to live with us."

Just as the thought of black freedom conjures up many ideas to whites, so does it to blacks. There seem to be two levels of freedom. There is the one level where people see

Mandela, Sisulu and Mbeki back home and all the men and women in exile re-united in jollity. Beyond that is a curtain. People know there is something terribly wrong about the present system, but what shape a different one will take is something they cannot explain, at least not in words.

To some, freedom means the turning of the tables where the black man will be on top of the white man. There are many stories about what will happen when blacks take over. One woman maintains she will hunt down all the whites who were responsible for black suffering, lock them up at Voortrekkerhoogte and be their warder. On Sunday, her prisoners will go without shoes, winter, or summer. Similar stories are common, half in jest and half serious.

Some see freedom as suddenly acquiring money and moving into white areas, while others see the disappearing of the police and casspirs in the township. To others the release of Mandela will be freedom. "As long as Mandela is in prison I will keep on fighting. I am not afraid to die. I have nothing to lose. But the day he is free, then I will be afraid to die," said an activist.

To others, Mandela's release means nothing. Nor does the scrapping of apartheid. "So what, we will still have to contend with staff reductions, price increases, retrenchment and all the constraints which black people have to live with." Whereas if the whole system is changed, including property relations and the abolition of large-scale private ownership, then we have a new order where the government will make employment available to the people, where people have the right to work and working ceases to be the privilege of a few.

For a domestic worker living in Jabavu, it is very different: "Things are getting better now. Even our wages have been improved, it is just that the cost of living has gone very high. If only the government can allow our children better education, I would say that we are free. Look, as blacks what can we do for ourselves? Without the white man and his ways we are useless. Lately the white man has gone a long way to improve things for us. I only wish blacks could stop killing each other."

"What is freedom?" asks Joe Khoza, who has spent 16 of his 50 years on Robben Island. "We want to be free from oppression, but then what?"

He would like to see certain black attitudes change. "Freedom, to too many blacks, is the power to grab. To be able to get things. That to me is not freedom. Freedom is being responsible. It is the ability to keep time, to make an aeroplane fly and the lifts work. To be able to be honest with whatever duty is entrusted to one, and not to have whitey behind with the whip all the time to keep things moving.

He further spoke of changing people being complacent. "So many black people know that their land was taken by whites, but have given up on themselves."

J. Cebekhulu of the Lembede Mda Foundation, which is based on self-reliance, maintains: "freedom is the expression by the people of control of the land's resources." It is not the accumulation of wealth or education. For Mpho Mashinini of Operation Hunger, freedom is the right to participate in the governing bodies of the country from grassroots level. "That is the one way which will ensure that everybody's interests are secured."

"Freedom is relative" says a Wits student. "What might be freedom for Dr Motlana is certainly not freedom for my mother in Senaoane. Motlana is self employed; he does not need to pander to whites and accept abuse from any white person. But my mother who is a factory worker and is entirely dependent on whites, must swallow all they throw at her."

Writer Sej Motau feels strongly. "We know about flag freedom, where people suddenly find themselves free and don't know what to do. Some people equate independence with getting manna from heaven. What freedom actually means is the right to do certain things, allowance to do certain things. Freedom is more costly than oppression. Freedom has small print which people ought to read carefully."

To many South Africa is seen as the last bastion of colonialism. Stories abound of how in some parts of Africa when the "natives" got independence they rushed into offices with pens behind their ears all wanting to be clerks. That does not seem to be a factor in South Africa. Many blacks have taken a look at what brought about the downfall of a number of independent African countries.

It may be true that some blacks think come Uhuru then with all be hunky dory, but there are many responsible down-to-earth people who only want jobs and education opportunities, and as one says: "laws made not by white people only, laws that will be made by us too."

There are some who expect these laws to mean changes in earnings. A nightwatchman says the present laws are double standards. "Look at my salary. I get peanuts. To me it really does not matter that I am uneducated. The fact of the matter is I watch over this building for 14 hours and the owner is hardly ever here. But at the end of the month he collects a huge cheque which he hasn't worked for and I go away with peanuts. Is it fair that he should steal from me by not paying me properly. He is protected by the laws made by his fellow men."

"I don't care for politics," said one typist. "All I know is the country is not run right. The whites are not happy, the blacks are also not happy. I do not even understand the freedom you are talking about because if a black



government takes over there will even be more bloodshed. To me a black government is not the answer to our problems. A good government is the solution. We blacks need a person, be he black or white who will put our case across in parliament. Someone whom we will vote in, not the stooges that the government gives us."

Her colleague did not agree. She strongly felt a black person has to represent the interest of blacks in parliament. "How can a white person represent us? What does he know about our plight?"

Although people had different ideas of freedom, they knew there was a lot they did not like about the system. Education featured top on the list of things they wanted to acquire. Housing and wages were also among the issues to be tackled if they were free. Voting came in also as a priority. The scrapping of the Mixed Marriages Act and debate about the Group Areas Act were non-issues to them.

But the more people I spoke to the more I realised how abstract a noun freedom was. If we had more understanding about what was at stake, perhaps there would be less fears and less dreams.

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**Assocom Notes Change in Young Black Attitudes**  
34000069a Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English  
22 Oct 87 p 21

[Article by David Furlonger]

[Text] East London—Young blacks already considered themselves to be living in a post-apartheid SA, Assocom's congress was told yesterday.

This was one of the reasons for the recent racial violence in Johannesburg's eastern suburbs, Consumer Behaviour director Eric Mafuna said.

He said young blacks thought of themselves as the equals of whites and lived their lives as such. When they wanted to relax one recent Saturday, they headed for Johannesburg's parks, as young whites do.

"There are no parks in the townships. They have all been turned into squatter camps and shanty towns. So the young people come to the white towns," Mafuna said.

Having come as equals, the blacks were faced with whites who considered there were too many blacks, and called the police. That started the violence, he said.

While whites expressed horror at the incident, blacks were not surprised. They had expected such a confrontation to happen one day.

"It is going to be repeated," Mafuna said.

He said blacks' perceptions of a post-apartheid SA stemmed from the long-term realization that change was coming and they must prepare for it. This contrasted with the short-term view of whites concerned only with next week's problem.

Mafuna had a message for government in its opposition to extra-parliamentary political activities. "The government itself has joined the extra-parliamentary movement. When last did anything worthwhile come out of Parliament? To black South Africans, it has become irrelevant."

9738

### **Poll Records Religious Dissatisfaction Among Whites**

34000069b Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English  
19 Oct 87 p 11

[Article by Brian Stuart: "35pc of Anglicans are 'Dissatisfied Because of Tutu'"]

[Text] The actions of Archbishop Desmond Tutu have caused dissatisfaction among 35 percent of White adherents of the Anglican Church in South Africa, according to an opinion poll conducted in August.

Political factors have also led to dissatisfaction among 20 percent of supporters of the NG Kerk, with 14 percent considering moving to another church.

This appears from the latest survey of adult White opinion in South Africa by Market and Opinion Surveys for Rapport, and published in that newspaper yesterday.

The survey showed that 14 percent of the statistical group declared allegiance to no church—9 percent of Afrikaners and 20 percent of English-speaking South Africans. Of all White adults, 38 percent were members of the NG Kerk, with the Methodist Church second at 8.5 percent of adult Whites.

Among Afrikaners, 64 percent of the NG Kerk, 8 percent of the Gereformeerde Kerk and 6.8 percent of the Hervormde Kerk.

Members of the Apostolic Faith Mission all declared themselves satisfied with their church. Among members of the Hervormde Kerk, 94 percent said they were satisfied, compared with 87 percent in the Gereformeerde Kerk, 79 percent in the Presbyterian Church, 68 percent in the NG Kerk, 58 percent in the Catholic Church, 51 percent in the Methodist Church and only 35 percent in the Anglican Church.

Among NG Kerk members, 4 percent said they were very dissatisfied and 16 percent said they were fairly dissatisfied, as against 10 percent of Anglicans very dissatisfied and 25 percent fairly dissatisfied.



Among Catholics, 9 percent very dissatisfied and 10 percent fairly dissatisfied.

Of these dissatisfied in the NG Kerk, 35 percent complained about "infiltration" for the opening of their churches to all, 14 percent said the church was "political", and 5 percent disapproved of the leadership of Prof Johan Heyns.

Among those thinking about moving to another church, 27 percent were considering the recently established Afrikaans Protestant Church, 24 percent Methodist, 18.5 percent the Hervormde Kerk and 10 percent the Apostolics.

Among those dissatisfied in the Anglican Church, 64 percent gave Archbishop Tutu and the SA Council of Churches as reasons for their dissatisfaction, while a further 28 percent complained that the church was too political.

Among Catholics, 46 percent of those who were dissatisfied gave political reasons.

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#### **Black Women Outnumber Black Men in Business Starts**

34000068c Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English  
22 Oct 87 p 2

[Article by Sophie Tema]

[Text] Black women were moving into the white business world faster than their male counterparts, a Remuneration Division of P-E Corporate Services survey has shown.

Remuneration division manager Naomi Brehm said the wage gap between black men and women in the skilled and semi-skilled categories had grown much smaller than in any other race group.

At the skilled level, black women earned more than their male counterparts because black men were still staying predominantly in black men's jobs while black women were moving into what used to be white women's jobs.

Brehm said black women who moved into skilled jobs were those who held a degree or had some sort of tertiary education.

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#### **Sayco President Discusses International Support, Growth**

34000074a Cape Town GRASSROOTS in English  
Sep 87 p 7

[Text] Youth organisation from various parts of the world have promised their full support to the struggles of the South African Youth Congress (Sayco) and the oppressed people of our country.

This was recently revealed by Sayco President Peter Mokaba and general secretary Rapu Molefane, in an interview with GRASSROOTS.

Mokaba said that the concept of international solidarity was viewed seriously by Sayco. In a period of six months since the 700 000-strong organisation was launched in Cape Town, comrades from Sayco have visited countries like Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Britain, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique.

"We realise that our struggle is not an isolated one. We link it up with the struggling people of Africa and rest of the world. It is clear that Africa cannot be free until we achieve our freedom in South Africa," said Mokaba.

He continued: "When we go to the people in neighbouring states, we do not go there to ask them for favours. We regard them as part and parcel of our struggle.

No legal organisation before Sayco has taken this step. We have trust in the people. We have opted not only for support of Governments but support of the people in the neighbouring states. The nature of the solidarity movements is not something that the South African Youth want to impose—it is something we can achieve through discussion and working together.

Sayco executive members who have traveled abroad include Ephraim Nkwe and Simon Ntombela from Southern Transvaal and Natal respectively.

The response to the visits was "very, very positive", according to Rapu Molefane.

"The delegations were well received and other youth groups have promised to put everything behind Sayco. They have also pledged to redouble their efforts to get their Governments to apply sanctions and disinvest from South Africa."

Meanwhile in the country, Sayco has grown rapidly, gaining a possible 100 000 members since its launch. At the time of the launch, held in Cape Town, Sayco had a membership of 600 000 coming from 1 200 youth congresses countrywide.

Rapu Molefane spoke at length about Sayco's growth. He said: "Presently most youth in the country identify with Sayco. We have had letters from remote parts of the country from youth groups who want to affiliate. We

have also received word that comrades have formed branches of Sayco within prison. At least ten more youth congresses have applied for affiliation since Sayco's launch." Mokaba adds "There has been a proliferation of village-based youth congresses in areas like Venda and Kwnadebele. Sayco and the UDF have even won the loyalty of chiefs and princes in certain homelands. The mine youth have grouped themselves and plan to form part of Sayco."

Since the launching a number of regional structures of Sayco have been formed. This has happened in the Orange Free State, Northern Cape, Southern and Northern Transvaal and Eastern Cape. The June 16 commemorations were mainly spearheaded by the youth congresses, a poster on the freedom charter has been produced and a campaign was launched to save the lives of 33 young South Africans currently on death row in Pretoria.

Sayco has developed a strong working relationship with organisations like the National Education Crisis Committee, Cosatu and the National Students Coordinating Committee.

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#### **National Party Criticizes Right-Wing Propaganda Use in Schools**

34000068a Johannesburg *THE CITIZEN in English*  
27 Oct 87 pp 1, 2

[Text] Blatant propagating of Right-wing politics by principals and teachers among schoolchildren in the Pretoria area along the lines of a "white revolution" were yesterday sharply condemned by a senior National Party parliamentary front benchman who investigated allegations of this over the last two weeks.

Mr Albert Nothnagel, MP for Innesdal and deputy chairman of the NP parliamentary caucus, said yesterday in a statement he was sending a comprehensive memorandum on the matter to the White "own affairs" Minister of Education and Culture, Mr Piet Clase.

This followed an uproar in Pretoria last week when parents protested at a retired clergyman making "extremely racist and confrontationist" remarks, in the presence of the principal, while speaking on "spiritual guidance" to a standard nine class at the Hoerskool Hendrik Verwoerd.

Mr Nothnagel, in whose constituency the school is located, stepped in immediately, promising he would investigate and report on the situation to Mr Clase.

Among other allegations and incidents at this and other schools in the Pretoria area the MP investigated, were a principal displaying an Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging sticker on his car and permission to the Right-wing Afrikaner Volkswag to present a book prize.

"Parents are deeply disturbed by Right-wing politicking in and around our schools," Mr Nothnagel said in his statement, adding he felt the problem was of such proportions that it should be handled publicly and at the highest level.

"The Right-wing radical spirit and attitude of many educators and school committees at schools has reached danger point and it is extremely harmful to the education of our children.

"Furthermore, this type of politicking is causing serious divisions among the parent community.

"If a school principal drives to school with an AWB sticker on his car, a teacher does the same at another school and the Afrikaner Volkswag is allowed to present a book prize at yet another, we are clearly facing a provocative state of mind of educators which cannot be allowed to continue," Mr Nothnagel said.

A conclusion might be that some teacher leaders did not associate themselves "heart and soul" with the government's new constitution and reform policy.

Teachers and state officials had the right to vote for whom they wished, but they were constitutionally and professionally obliged afterwards to carry out, without qualifications, the policy of the government of the day.

Power-sharing and the elimination of discrimination were government policy now and teachers who did not want to adhere to government policy could not expect the taxpayer to carry the burden of their salaries and other privileges.

It was the spirit of opposition to constitutional and government policy that contributed to fanning racism which was sweeping through the country.

"We cannot allow our children to become victims of this spirit.

"Our schools must be institutions where our children are weaned of racial prejudice and hate. Even, and in fact particularly, the racism which they apparently learn from their parents and some political leaders and activists."—Sapa.

9738

**Economy Shows Signs of Recovery**  
34000082a Nairobi DAILY NATION in English  
13 Oct 87 p 10

[Article: "Good News for Uganda's Economy"]

[Text] Kampala, Monday—Ugandan companies will find it easier to get foreign exchange when the World Bank begins disbursing a \$105-million loan to support imports this month, according to Bank of Uganda officials.

Economists expected the economy will begin to take off in earnest in the coming years and diplomats say there are already clear signs that it is recovering from years of mismanagement and internal conflict.

The most obvious evidence for this is the amount of traffic in the streets of Kampala. Where, a year ago, there was hardly a car on the streets, now it is possible to be stuck in traffic jam for up to 20 minutes.

The government's priority is to get old industries working again and President Yoweri Museveni, in an independence day speech last Friday, forecast that production of many commodities this year would be three times higher than in 1985.

Regular supplies of Ugandan beer and cigarettes have reappeared on the market and later this year the country will be producing sugar for the first time since 1984.

The improvements have not yet reached the ordinary Ugandan whose monthly salary after the government brought in a new, devalued currency last May may be 300 new shillings (five dollars) compared with 15,000 old shillings (then about 10 dollars) before the changeover.

The companies directly affected by the easing of foreign currency restrictions produce soap, beer, food, tobacco, textiles and soft drinks, the Bank of Uganda officials told Reuters.

They will be able to obtain foreign exchange on an open general licence, bypassing administrative controls, and are expected to draw five to seven million dollars a month on top of the 6.1 million which oil companies already draw under the system to pay for fuel imports.

Uganda's earnings from exports, mainly coffee, have been running at between 25 and 30 million dollars a month, so the World Bank money will make an appreciable difference to the amount of foreign exchange available even for firms not eligible under the open licence system.

The World Bank loan is the first large installment of donor support since the Ugandan Government met its creditors in Paris in June and agreed on a total package that should bring in a little over 300 million dollars, mostly within one year, foreign economists said.

Economists predict that when the economy does take off again demand for black market dollars will increase—the black market rate is 150 shillings compared to the official 60 shillings.

"It could take another 2 to 3 years for the economy to generate enough foreign exchange to meet this increased demand and bring the official and parallel rates closer," one added.

Defence expenditure accounts for about 40 percent of the government budget and the army has increased in size to about 50,000 men from less than 20,000 when Museveni came to power in January last year.

"The war has stretched the expenditure side and it's not very comfortable. Peace is definitely less expensive than war," the Bank of Uganda official said. (Reuters)

/9604

**Number of Refugees in Kenya Growing**  
34000082b Nairobi DAILY NATION in English  
15 Oct 87 p 24

[Article: "Refugees Ranks Swelling"]

[Text] The number of Ugandan refugees entering Busia District in Kenya has risen to 3,000, the District Commissioner, Mr Simeon Chacha, said yesterday.

Addressing wananchi at a site identified in Nambale Division to settle the refugees, Mr Chacha said the refugees had been handed over to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees after the Ugandan administrators in Tororo District failed to honour the DC's invitation for talks about them.

The DC, a UNHCR official and an official of the Kenya Red Cross and Crescent Society, inspected 3,000 acres also set aside by wananchi for the refugees' livestock. (KNA)

/9604

**Metal Exports Through RSA Reduced**

34000067c Johannesburg *BUSINESS DAY* in English  
22 Sep 87 p 1

[Text] Zambia has cut metal exports through SA to 9 percent, says the Zambia Metal Marketing Corporation. Two years ago most copper was shipped via SA.

IOn its annual report released in Lusaka yesterday, the State corporation says 84 percent of its export volume,

mainly copper, goes through the Tanzanian port of Dar-es-Salaam. The remainder is railed through the Mozambican port of Beira.

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